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The buying and selling of claims against companies in financial
distress is not a new phenomenon. In times of financial distress,
liquidity has always commanded a profit. However, the late 1980s and
early 1990s saw the first significant trading of claims under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code,1 our relatively new and novel system of
corporate reorganization. Traditionally scorned by the financial
establishment, distress investment came into vogue with the
"megabankruptcies" that followed in the wake of the leveraged
buyout boom of the 1980s.2 With its prospects for huge profits, claims
trading in Chapter 11 became a Wall Street staple. Even mainstream
mutual funds participated.3 The size of the market was estimated to
run as high as $300 billion.4
Another boom-and-bust financial cycle appears to be underway.
"Speculation is flourishing."'5 The next wave of corporate
bankruptcies is predicted to arrive shortly, 6 and it is sure to generate
significant claims trading activity. An examination of the effects of
claims trading on the Chapter 11 confirmation process is therefore
timely.
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994). The Bankruptcy Code may be referred to herein as the
"Code."
2 See, e.g., Jaye Scholl, Joy in Sorrow:A Pairof Young Money Managers Profitfrom Failure,
BARRON'S, Feb. 20, 1995, at 19. "[T]he investment strategy took hold in the 'Eighties, a decade
whose financial history can be summed up in superlatives: a bumper crop of mergers and
acquisitions, financed by mountains of high-yielding debt, followed by a record number of
bankruptcies and an unprecedented amount of defaulted paper." Id. at 21.
3 See Diana B. Henriques, The Vulture Game, N.Y. TImEs, July 19, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at
18.
4 Id. at 20 (quoting Herb Stiles, President of T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund).
5 Floyd Norris, Market Watch. Investors Love Loans to Deadbeats, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 6,
1995, § 3, at 1 (commenting on proposed borrowing of $5.4 billion by Westinghouse Electric
Corp. to finance acquisition of CBS Inc. and noting that the amount of borrowing exceeds total
value of Westinghouse stock).
6 See, e.g., Book Review: The 1995 Bankruptcy Yearbook and Almanac, BANKR. CT. DEC.
WLY. NEWS & COMMENT (LRP), May 30, 1995, at A9.

The dramatic increase in high yield bond issuance, coupled with an apparent loosening of
standards by bank lenders, has created a large pool of potential corporate bankruptcies.
While the coming wave of big bankruptcies will be nowhere near the magnitude of the last
bulge in 1987-1992, it should represent a significant increase from current levels. Whether
the upturn in large filings occurs in 1995 or in 1996 may depend on the strength of the
economy in the coming months.
Id. at A9 (quoting George Putnam III of New Generation Research, Inc., publisher of the 1995
Bankruptcy Yearbook and Almanac); see also Scholl, supra note 2, at 21 ("Studies indicate
there's a three-year lag between issue and default rates. Bankruptcies should return in big numbers beginning in 1995.").
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Enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,7 Chapter
11 creates a reorganization regime premised on collective negotiation
among the parties. To a greater degree than the reorganization
statutes that preceded it, Chapter 11 distributes leverage to all parties
in interest and depends on negotiated outcomes for both the ultimate
terms of reorganization and resolution of the debtor's significant
operating issues during the case.8 Creditors matter in this process.
Far from being mere placeholders, creditors in Chapter 11 have
potentially significant influence over the course of reorganization.
This potential for creditor leverage has created lucrative
opportunities for bankruptcy arbitrage-investment in claims against
debtors in Chapter 11. Professional investors purchase bankruptcy
claims at a discount from their face value, generally succeeding to the
rights of their selling claimants. The willing sellers typically lack the
capital, expertise, or patience to endure a reorganization process that
for a large public company may last several years. 9 Cashing out is an
attractive option for these selling claimants. For its part, the
bankruptcy investor purchases claims strategically in order to exploit
opportunities for creditor leverage in the reorganization process. It
attempts to purchase a good seat at the negotiating table in order to
influence the terms of reorganization. In particular, the bankruptcy
investor will negotiate for optimal treatment of its claims under the
plan of reorganization.
Unfortunately, claims trading has the potential to impede
reorganization, imposing costs on the debtor company and its
creditors. Because of Chapter 11's collective nature and the
significant role of creditors in the process, instability in the creditor
constituency may be disruptive. Throughout the course of a case,
parties make significant reorganization-specific investment. They
develop relationships with each other and acquire specialized
knowledge about the business. They learn to cooperate. In this
context, participants may not be fungible; the identities of particular
creditors may matter. Creditor turnover may therefore destabilize the
process. A significant creditor's exit from, or entry into, the process
may render other parties' prior investment worthless, or may require
significant additional investment by the parties. 10 Even the potential
for trading may impose costs on the parties by deterring
cooperation."
7 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (current version at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994)).
8 See infra subpart II.A.
9 See infra section I.B.1.
10 See infra subpart II.B.
11 See infra section II.B.3.
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Courts and commentators have been slow to recognize and
respond to these cost implications. The buying and selling of a
bankruptcy claim has traditionally been conceptualized as a private
transaction between willing parties in a free market, not subject to
outside scrutiny or restriction. As with most economic rights, claims
enjoy a strong presumption of free alienability. "The idea of the
'market' is extremely powerful in both economics and social
theory," 12 and its imagery figures prominently in discussion over the
proper role for judicial supervision of claims trading. Commentators
debating the propriety of various acts of judicial intervention have
been mindful of the sanctity of the market and the potential chilling of
this market from excessive judicial regulation. 13 Comparisons of the
claims market with public securities markets, and claims with publicly
traded securities, have been suggested. 14 From this perspective,
judicial intervention is best limited to policing abuses at the fringes of
the market. Fundamentally, however, the market should remain
unsupervised.
In fact, judicial intervention has been limited to remedying
specific perceived abuses. Courts have intervened, for example, to
protect claimants from selling without adequate information, 15 to
penalize purchasing by the debtor's fiduciaries, 16 and to disqualify
votes of claims not purchased or voted in good faith.17 In only a few
isolated cases have courts noted the possibility of more general
adverse effects from claims trading, and then only in the context of
some specific perceived abuse.' 8
Commentators have generally failed to focus on process concerns
and their cost implications, but instead have emphasized the benefits
12 David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the Trading of
FinancialAssets, 32 B.C. L. REv. 967 (1991).
13 See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
There has been a surprising dearth of academic commentary focused specifically on claims
trading. The major articles include Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and
Taking Control of Corporationsin Chapter 11, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter
Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims]; Herbert P. Minkel, Jr. & Cynthia A. Baker, Claims and
Control in Chapter 11 Cases: A Call for Neutrality, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 35 (1991); Chaim J.
Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims and Taking Control of
Corporationsin Chapter 11, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Fortgang & Mayer, 1991
Developments]; Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims:
Participationsand Disputed Claims, 15 CARnozo L. REv. 733 (1993) [hereinafter Fortgang &

Mayer, 1993 Developments].
14 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.

15 See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
17 See infra sections I.B.3, III.C.2. For a comprehensive summary of judicial intervention in
the claims trading context, see Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13.
18 See infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
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to be derived from trading. 19 Claims trading may certainly benefit
willing buyers and sellers. It may help to facilitate reorganization in
some cases. 20 However, trading is not an unqualified blessing. Costs
may be imposed, even in situations in which trading may be deemed
desirable or beneficent overall. Nonetheless, cost implications have to
date been largely ignored.
Restrictions on trading may be justified in light of these cost
implications, despite traditional notions of free alienability of
property. The rights that are the subject of trade are actually created
in Chapter 11. Claims are bundles of rights uniquely tailored to, and
inextricably linked with, Chapter l1's collective settlement process.
Moreover, it is the imposition of Chapter 11 that endows claims with
their market value. To the extent their transfer imposes unacceptable
costs on the reorganization process, restrictions are appropriate. The
specific rehabilitative goals of Chapter 11 should take precedence
over general notions of free alienability.
This Article concerns the confirmation process in Chapter 11, the
relation between the process and the rights traded as Chapter 11
claims, and the costs that may arise from claims trading. The Article
focuses not on the fringe of the market-situations traditionally
perceived as potentially abusive. Instead, this Article focuses on
"mainstream" trading in the context of large public companies: the
acquisition of claims against a Chapter 11 debtor by outside investors
unaffiliated with the debtor, with the intention of realizing profits
through the plan process. 21 It shall be argued that even with
mainstream claims trading, externalities may be visited on the estate
and parties in interest, and that the cost implications justify equitable
relief in certain contexts.
In particular, this Article's purposes are three-fold: first, to
highlight potential adverse effects of claims trading on the
confirmation process, effects that to date have not been emphasized in
the bankruptcy literature; second, to propose a general justification
for restricting transferability of claims in light of these adverse effects,
despite the traditional presumption of free alienability of claims; and
third, to outline the contours of appropriate equitable relief.
Part I describes the Chapter 11 confirmation process, the
mechanics, economics, and benefits of claims trading in Chapter 11,
and the traditional free alienability account of claims trading.
19 See infra section I.B.2.

20 See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
21 While trading certainly occurs in contexts other than reorganizations of large public
companies, the large cases probably account for most of the trading, and the ripple effects from
the failure of large public companies suggest that much is at stake in their successful
reorganization. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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Part II discusses the collective nature of Chapter 11, its devices
for encouraging bargaining and cooperation among the parties in
interests, and the significance of the parties' relationships developed
over the course of the case. Part II further explains the externalities
that claims trading may impose on the process and the particular role
of the bankruptcy investor.
Part III presents a justification for limiting trading in response to
these externalities and takes issue with the traditional free alienability
account. Part III concludes by discussing precedent under the Code
for courts' granting of equitable relief from claims trading.
Part IV describes a cost-based approach to such equitable relief.
In particular, injunctive relief in the form of a "trading injunction" is
described-both its contours and the contexts in which it should be
available. Prospective benefits from claims trading are also
considered in this formulation of appropriate equitable relief.
I. THE CoNTExr
A. The Confirmation Process
Bankruptcy law has two general aims: to provide relief to the
debtor from the collection efforts of its creditors and to treat all creditors equitably in distributing recoveries from the bankruptcy estate.
Reorganization of a business under Chapter 11 is a collective proceeding that incorporates other aims as well. Reorganization is premised
on the concept that the debtor is worth more as a going concern than
in liquidation. That is, continuation of the debtor's business will create more value than will dismemberment and piecemeal sale of the
assets.2 Chapter 11 attempts to preserve the debtor's going concern
value, thereby maximizing the value of the estate and creditor recoveries, while mediating conflicts among the debtor, its creditors, and
other interested parties.23
22 This not only maximizes creditor recoveries, but also addresses a multiplicity of other
interests implicated when a company faces the prospect of failure. While debtor-creditor issues
are central to the proceedings, the complex web of relationships with which the company is
involved includes noncreditor parties as well. For example, suppliers, customers, employees,
local governments, or taxing authorities may or may not be creditors of the debtor, but may
nonetheless be interested in the debtor's continuing viability. E.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymakingin an Imperfect World, 92 MicH. L. REv. 336,355 (1993) (noting Congress's
recognition of the effect of business failure on the surrounding community and parties with no
formal legal entitlements vis-a-vis the debtor, and the indirect way in which the Bankruptcy
Code addresses this concern).
23 The purpose of a business reorganization case ... is to restructure a business's finances
so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and
produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets
that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable
than those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return on assets that a business can produce is inadequate to compensate those who have invested in the business. Cash flow
problems may develop, and require creditors of the business, both trade creditors and long-
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The focal point for Chapter 11 is the plan of reorganization,
which is a negotiated rearrangement of the debtor's obligations to its
creditors and equity security holders. The rights and obligations
among the debtor and its debt- and equityholders are adjusted so as to
render the reorganized debtor a viable economic entity. A plan may
reduce the interest rate or extend the maturity of certain debt obligations; it may satisfy other debt obligations with issuance of new equity;
it may pay cash to certain creditors but at a discount from the full face
amount of their claims. The particular adjustments to these rights and
obligations are left to the negotiation of the parties, subject to only a
few substantive limitations.
The scheme for formulating a plan borrows a basic notion from
the securities laws:
Parties should be given adequate disclosure of relevant information, and
they should make their own decision on the acceptability of the proposed plan of reorganization .... The parties are left to their own to
negotiate a fair settlement .... Negotiation among the parties after full
disclosure will govern how the value of the reorganizing company will be
distributed among creditors and stockholders.... [T]he outcome...
must be somewhere between the going-concern value and the liquidation value. 24
Beyond this limitation, the allocation of value is left to the parties'
negotiation.
A plan that meets all the requirements imposed by the Code, including creditor and equityholder approval requirements, may be
"confirmed" by the bankruptcy court,25 in which case it becomes the
26
definitive document under which the debtor's reorganization occurs.
1. Formal Rules.-While the Code imposes few substantive limitations on the permissible outcome of plan negotiation, the "rules of
engagement" are quite elaborate. The Code attempts to structure a
framework for multiparty bargaining, in which (1) the debtor will initially control and coordinate the plan negotiation process, and (2)
creditor consent must be obtained in order for a plan to be conterm lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If the business can extend or reduce its
debts, it often can be returned to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179
[hereinafter HousE REPoRT].
24 Id. at 224. The floor of liquidation value is implemented through the requirement of
§ 1129(a)(7)(A) of the Code, which requires that any dissenting member of an accepting class
receive no less under the plan than it would in liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (1994).
The ceiling of going concern value is implemented through § 1129(b), which embodies the Chapter 11 absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994).
25 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1994).
26 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1994).
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firmed.27 The debtor retains the exclusive right to propose a plan during the first 120 days of the proceeding, 28 and multiple extensions of
this exclusivity period are routinely granted in the large cases. 29 In
addition, the debtor30generally continues to manage its business during
the reorganization.
Creditor consent is determined pursuant to the Code's elaborate
voting provisions, which work as follows. The plan must classify
claims,3 ' with only "substantially similar" claims being allowed in the
same class. 32 Voting is by class, 33 and all claims in the same class must
receive the same treatment under a plan. 4 A class is entitled to vote
27 Consent of equity interest holders may also be required. As a practical matter, however,
their consent is rarely an issue at confirmation, either because their interests have been adequately represented by the debtor's management-in which case they will consent to the planor because the plan can usually be confirmed over their dissent via cramdown. See infra notes
39-45 and accompanying text. For this reason, the discussion of confirmation requirements that
follows, while generally applicable to equity interests as well as claims, will refer only to claims.
28 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994). The court may, upon the request of a party in interest and for
cause, shorten the initial 120-day exclusivity period, id. § 1121(d), but this rarely happens, especially in larger cases.
29 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governancein the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 693 (1993). "In most
jurisdictions .... exclusivity is almost always maintained for the duration of the reorganization of
a large, publicly held company." ld. at 693 n.90. Even after exclusivity terminates, in the large
cases the plan that ultimately gets confirmed is almost exclusively a debtor-sponsored plan. See
generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter11 of
the Bankruptcy Code? Second Installment,57 AM. BANK. L.J. 247, 253 (1983) (discussing creditors' practical inability to propose credible operating plans).
30 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994). The Code provides for appointment of a trustee to replace the
debtor's management in certain situations, eg., "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case." Id. § 1104(a)(1). However, especially in the cases involving large
publicly held companies, appointment of a trustee is rare. E.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supranote
29, at 699.
31 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (1994). Certain types of priority claims, primarily administrative
expense claims and qualifying tax claims, are not required to be classified, id., and their treatment under a plan is explicitly prescribed in the Code. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A), (C).
32 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994). The Code permits a fair amount of discretion in classifying
claims, since even though claims that are "substantially similar" may be classified together, there
is no explicit requirement that substantially similar claims be placed in the same class. Courts
have, however, enunciated certain limitations on debtors' strategic use of classification. E.g.,
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture),
995 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992) (holding that "ordinarily," substantially similar claims should be classified together, and that separate classification
must be motivated by reasons independent of debtor's desire to create consenting impaired
class); Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck
Co.), 800 F.2d 581,586 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that "there must be some limit" to debtor's power
to gerrymander creditor classes).
33 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), (d) (1994).
34 Id. § 1123(a)(4). The holder of a claim may always consent to less favorable treatment of
its claim than the rest of the class. Id.
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only if its proposed treatment renders it impaired, 35 which basically
means that its rights are proposed to be altered under the terms of the
plan. 36 A class that is not impaired is deemed to have accepted the
plan, and it does not vote. 37 As for class acceptance, a class of claims
accepts the plan if both a majority in number of claims and two-thirds
in dollar amount of claims in the class vote to accept.38
A plan may be confirmed if each impaired class accepts the
plan.39 However, if any impaired class votes to reject the plan, then
the plan may be confirmed only under the "cramdown" provisions of
the Code.40 The most important cramdown requirement is that the
plan be "fair and equitable" with respect to any rejecting impaired
class. 4 ' Plan treatment of a rejecting impaired class is fair and equitable if the plan respects absolutely the priority of that class over junior
classes. This "absolute priority rule" requires, for example, that in order for a plan to be confirmed over the objection of an impaired class
of unsecured claims, the plan must provide either that such claims be
paid in full 42 or that no class junior to the objecting impaired class
receive any distribution.4 3 In other words, for any rejecting impaired
class of unsecured claims, the plan must not pay anything to any claim
or interest junior to the rejecting class without first paying in full each
claim in the rejecting class." By rejecting, the impaired class basically
insists upon getting whatever is left of the estate after senior classes
have been paid,45 up to the full amount of its claims. Only after full
payment to that rejecting class may junior classes receive any
consideration.
The classification, voting, and cramdown provisions, then, essentially work as follows. Within a class, an accepting majority may force
the proposed class treatment on the nonaccepting minority, even
though such treatment amounts to less than full payment. The only
limitation on this tyranny of the majority is that each nonaccepting
See id. § 1129(a)(8).
36 See id. § 1124. See infra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the strategic
significance of the impairment concept.
37 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (1994). A class that will receive nothing under a proposed plan also
does not vote, but is deemed to have rejected the plan. Id § 1126(g).
38 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994). A class of interests accepts if two-thirds in amount of interests
35

vote to accept. Id. § 1126(d).
39 Id. § 1129(a)(8).
40 Id. § 1129(b).
41 Id. § 1129(b)(1).

42 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i).
43 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).

44 In this situation, the only alternative for the plan proponent-usually the debtor-is to
modify the proposed treatment of the objecting class to render the class unimpaired, in which
case the class is deemed to have accepted the plan.

45 No class may be paid more than the amount of its claims. HousE REPORT, supra note 23,
at 414.
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claim in the class must receive no less under the plan than it would
have received in liquidation.46 On the other hand, nonaccepting creditors in a class, by defeating either of the majorities required for acceptance by a class of claims, can block acceptance by that class. This
prevents confirmation of any plan that proposes to pay any consideration to creditors junior to the nonaccepting class without paying in full
all claims in the nonaccepting class.47
2. Bargaining over the Plan.-The formal rules alone do not
capture the dynamics of plan negotiation. The rules merely provide
leverage points for the various parties in interest. To a great extent,
the negotiating skill of each party and its ability to use its leverage in
Chapter 11 determine the consideration it ultimately receives under
the plan. The terms of reorganization are set by the aggregate outcomes of the multiple negotiations.
Understanding the dynamics of the negotiations is critical to an
understanding of the reorganization process, given that for large public companies, most plans are consensual. All impaired classes ulti-

mately vote in favor of the debtor's plan. 48 This means that formal
49

resort to the cramdown alternative under Section 1129(b) is rare,
and that despite their right to insist on absolute priority, creditors generally do not. Instead of strict absolute priority, plans generally offer
some consideration to every class in order to facilitate consensus. 50

46 See supra note 24.
47 One additional significant confirmation requirement exists, which must be satisfied regardless of the outcome of class voting. It is the feasibility requirement, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11)
(1994), which goes to the question whether the plan will work. See 5 COLLIER ON BAuRuvrcy
1129.02, at 1129-60 to 1129-64 (15th ed. 1995). Because a feasibility finding is required regardless of overwhelming creditor approval of the plan, it is an oft-litigated issue in contested
confirmations.
48 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 137-38
(1990). In their seminal study of large public company reorganizations, Professors LoPucki and
Whitford found a very high level of plan acceptance. Of all classes of claims and interests for the
43 reorganizations studied, only 5.6% (21 of 377 classes) failed to vote in favor of the plan, and
of those, almost all (17 of the 21) were deemed rejections, Le., those classes were to receive
nothing under the plan. Id. at 141; see supra note 37. Only 0.8% (3 of 377 classes) actively
contested confirmation. LoPucki & Whitford, supra, at 141. LoPucki & Whitford, supranote 29,
also came from the LoPucki and Whitford study.
49 "[T]he conventional wisdom was that contested cramdown hearings were to be avoided."
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 48, at 144.
50 Even in the case of insolvent debtors, shareholders usually received some distribution
under the plan. Id. at 142-43. Insolvency in these cases was not seriously contested. Id. at 144.
Therefore, an absolute priority distribution would have left shareholders with nothing. Senior
classes in these cases willingly gave up value to junior classes in order to achieve consensus:
"[T]he creditors' agreements to the equity distributions... were in no significant part the reflection of either real or supposed legal entitlements." Id. However, the actual deviations from
strict absolute priority were found to be small in percentage terms. Id. at 178.
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The formal rules of plan confirmation, then, create a bargaining
regime in which leverage is distributed among the parties in such a
way that each and all may influence the terms of reorganization.
While the substantive rule of absolute priority would seem to favor
senior creditors, procedural entitlements favor junior creditors and
the debtor.
The debtor-in particular, the debtor's management-controls
the plan formulation process. Through this control, the debtor will
frequently attempt to extract value from senior classes in favor of junior classes 5 -either junior creditors or equityholders. 52 The debtor's
According to the conventional wisdom, senior creditors' holdout power under the absolute
priority rule is tempered by a desire to avoid extensive litigation over the panoply of cramdown
and other confirmation requirements. In the cramdown situation, the court may have to determine, among other things, a valuation of the debtor and any securities proposed to be issued
under a plan, in order to determine whether the absolute priority rule has been satisfied as to
each rejecting impaired class. This valuation will generally involve a battle of expert testimony,
with teams of investment bankers and accountants attempting to justify result-oriented projections of the debtor's future earnings and arguing over an appropriate multiplier in order to reach
a desirable discounted cash flow valuation. See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra

note 47, 1129.03, at 1129-102 to 1129-116 (describing valuation standards in detail).
Junior claimants have an additional incentive to avoid forcing this valuation. They run the
risk that an unfavorable valuation may eliminate entirely their chance to participate in any distribution under the plan. Given the complexities of valuation, the expense of litigation, and the
uncertainty of the outcome, all parties have incentives to settle.
A premium is thus placed on obtaining the consent of all impaired classes in order to avoid
application of the fair and equitable rule as embodied in section 1129(b). Thus, there is the
incentive for the holders of the senior interests to share the distribution with junior interest
holders so that the junior classes will accept the plan and avoid the necessity of a full-scale
going-concern valuation of the debtor. There is, similarly, an incentive for the junior classes
to accept the plan rather than run the risk of a valuation hearing under section
1129(b)(2)(B) or (C), which could result in a determination that they are not entitled to
participate under the plan at all.
Lawrence P. King, Chapter11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107, 130 (1979);
see also Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cramdown Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L-. 133, 171 (1979) ("[T]he complexity of cramdown should
encourage the debtor to bargain with creditors to gain acceptance of a plan in the majority of
cases.").

In the LoPucki and Whitford study, numerous interviews with attorneys and judges elicited
the general sentiment that every class had to receive some consideration in order to achieve
consensus. LoPucki & Whitford, supranote 48, at 144. Among the reasons given for the overwhelming preference for consensual plans was the desire to avoid the expense of and delay
associated with litigating a contested cramdown. Id. The authors question the factual basis for
the perception that cramdown is economically undesirable. They assert that the costs of
cramdown litigation do not fully explain the tendency toward consensual plans. Instead, they
suggest that bankruptcy culture exerts significant influence. Id. at 154.
51 Professors LoPucki and Whitford have shown the difficulty of attempting to generalize
about whom management represents in the large reorganization cases. LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 29, at 742-47 (finding that such factors as the debtor's solvency and the presence of
significant shareholders on the debtor's board of directors affect management loyalties, and that
management might not align with any faction, but instead might pursue an independent policy of
preserving the company or maximizing the estate).
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control of the process allows it significant leverage toward effecting
such a distribution.
The debtor's exclusivity is critical to its leverage in plan negotiation.53 As every lawyer knows, simply controlling the drafting of the
operative documents in negotiation creates substantial influence over
the ultimate outcome. The debtor's exclusive privilege of drafting the
plan has the same effect. 54 Because no other party may file a competing plan, the proposals initially under consideration are the debtor's.
As the protagonist, the debtor not only proposes the consideration to be received by various creditors as part of the reorganization,
but may also influence the voting through the debtor's structuring of
the plan. Under the elaborate creditor voting system, creditor consent
need not be unanimous, and not all creditors are entitled to vote.55
Which creditors vote, and how crucial their votes are, depend to a
great extent on the debtor's classification of claims in the plan and the
debtor's ability to render claims unimpaired. The debtor has some
flexibility to dilute the voting strength of recalcitrant creditors by placing such creditors' claims in a class with cooperative claimants. Conversely, the voting strength of cooperative parties may be augmented

52 In the LoPucki and Whitford study, management of insolvent debtors were very likely to
align themselves with creditors. lI at 745. From the management self-preservation perspective,
this makes sense, as creditors would stand to receive significant blocks of equity in the reorganized company. See generallyJ. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain,65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
213, 218 (1991) (noting the potential divergence of interests as between management and old
equity). Fiduciary duties of management also shift from equityholders to creditors upon a corporation's insolvency. See infra note 238. As an empirical matter, management of solvent companies always aligned with equity. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 29, at 745.
Given the general preference for consensual plans, even when management aligns with
creditor interests, this would not generally preclude some attempt by management to effect some
distribution to equity. In any event, management's objectives in plan formulation generally include a scaling down of claims of senior classes from their absolute priority due in favor of junior
classes.
53 E.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 192 (1989) ("Studies on
agenda influence confirm the substantial leverage [exclusivity] provides the debtor (and existing
management) in negotiating over any proposal to restructure the firm.") (citing Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REv. 561 (1977));
Johnston, supra note 52, at 275 ("The chance to be 'first out of the gate' with the initial plan in
most cases allows the debtor to 'anchor' the terms of the final plan in its favor.").
54 The party that proposes the initial plan, even if it is just the first negotiating draft, will
always prepare it in a way that strongly favors whatever positions can be proposed on behalf
of that party or its constituents. Because it is likely that the initial draft will become the
starting point from which the final plan will flow, the proponent-biased draft serves to shift
the entire bargaining set of the parties toward the side favoring the "proponent" of the plan
and insures that the final agreement will be more favorable to the party that proposes the
plan than if the terms of the initial draft had been more even-handed.
Johnston, supra note 52, at 275.
55 See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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by strategic classification. 56 In addition, the debtor's proposed plan
treatment may render certain classes unimpaired under the plan, in
which case they are conclusively presumed to have accepted the
57

plan.

Exclusivity also enables the debtor to control the pace of the reorganization and, if necessary, to use delay as a device to encourage
settlement. The economics of delay allow the debtor's management to

favor equityholders over creditors, or some creditors over others,
since creditors generally accrue no interest on their claims during the
case 58 The filing of the Chapter 11 petition effectively forces creditors to extend credit to the debtor interest-free for the pendency of
the case. The differing appetites of equityholders and various creditors to weather delay enable the debtor to favor some groups
over
59
others and to use delay to extract concessions from creditors.

Once in bankruptcy, the debtor's management is generally authorized to run the business. 60 Management may use this control of
the business to gain leverage in plan negotiations. Management may
threaten to sell assets as a device to circumvent plan confirmation requirements. 61 Management may attempt or threaten to obtain
56 "[D]etermining when a claim or interest is 'substantially similar' to others... is a major
and strategically important task" because it allows the plan proponent some "ability to separate
or combine certain claims to increase the chance of obtaining class acceptances." Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W. Ras. L. Rav. 301, 329
(1982).
57 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. For example, the debtor may wish simply to
reinstate a particular loan at its contract rate of interest. This may be cheaper for the debtor
than attempting to cramdown the creditor if the contract rate of interest is below the market
rate. Provided that all defaults are cured, and the claimant is compensated for any damages
incurred, reinstatement renders such a claim unimpaired, 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (1994), and that
creditor is deemed to have accepted the plan.
58 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1994). The oversecured creditor accrues interest on its claim during
the pendency of the case, but only up to the value of its collateral. Id. § 506(b). The allowance
of this interest as part of the oversecured creditor's claim does not necessarily mean that the
interest is paid currently, although it is not uncommon for the debtor to agree to do so in exchange for postpetition financing from the secured creditor. A secured creditor may also be
entitled to adequate protection payments to the extent the estate's use or retention of the secured creditor's collateral results in a decrease in value of such collateral. Id. § 361(1).
59 "When management of a marginally solvent debtor is firmly in equity's camp, and particularly when pendency interest is unavailable, considerations of timing can be an especially important reason for creditor concessions to equity." LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 48, at 166.
60 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1994).
61 While such a proposal requires notice and a hearing, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1994), and
courts have scrutinized such proposed sales in light of their potential to circumvent plan confirmation requirements (e.g., Lionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders (In re Lionel
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063,1070 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring "some articulated business justification" for
sale); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d
935 (5th Cir. 1983) (disapproving sale agreement that purported to dictate some terms of future
plan)), even the threat may generate concessions.
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postpetition financing on terms unfavorable to existing creditors. 62
The debtor's investment strategy in Chapter 11 may also place a disproportionate risk on senior classes, who may bear the losses from a
risky investment strategy, but may not realize the full amount of any
63
gains.
For their part, creditors and equityholders are also given leverage
in the plan negotiation process. Creditors may vote to reject the
debtor's plan, triggering the cramdown requirements and application
of the absolute priority rule. 64 Because this may ultimately mean that
certain junior classes will receive no consideration under the plan, a
debtor interested in providing for some distribution to junior classes
may wish to avert this confrontation. A consensual plan will therefore
be preferred.
A stalemate in plan negotiation may also cause creditors to move
to terminate the debtor's exclusivity in order to file competing plans.
While termination of exclusivity in the large cases is rare, 65 the prospect that the debtor's management might lose control of the plan process may curtail its ability to use delay as a coercive device.
Creditors may threaten to oust the debtor's management. They
may do so either by petitioning for appointment of a trustee 66 or indirectly through pressure for officers' replacement. 67 As with termination of exclusivity, appointment of a trustee rarely happens, but the
threat does provide creditors with certain leverage.6
Widely dispersed creditors or equityholders may also benefit
from the formation of official committees. The Code specifically provides for appointment of a creditors' committee to represent un62 For example, management may agree to grant priming liens to the postpetition financer,
which would have priority over existing liens of prepetition creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)
(1994). Again, this requires notice and a hearing, but the threat itself may have some impact.
63 LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 29, at 683-84. For example, for the marginally solvent
debtor, gains from a risky investment strategy will inure primarily to shareholders, while losses
will be borne primarily by creditors.
64 Equity, as the most junior class, wields little leverage with its class vote because it does not
enjoy priority over anyone. For the insolvent debtor, even a plan that provides no distribution to
equity satisfies the absolute priority rule. The best the rejecting equity class could do is force a
valuation. However, if the equity class opposes a plan, it may find other avenues for leverage.
See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
65 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
66 See supra note 30.
67 "CEO turnover frequently resulted from creditor pressure." LoPucki & Whitford, supra
note 29, at 737. LoPucki and Whitford found that the rate of CEO turnover was much higher for
distressed companies than for large public companies generally, and that in terms of timing,
changes were concentrated around the filing of the petition and the confirmation date. Id. at
723-26.
68 Id. at 701.
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secured creditors. 69 This committee is charged with negotiating the
plan on behalf of its constituents, and generally acts as a watchdog on
behalf of unsecured creditors during the case. 70 The creditors' committee provides a voice in plan negotiation that might otherwise be
absent, given that widely dispersed small claimants may lack sufficient
economic incentive to monitor or participate actively in a case.
Additional committees representing creditors or equityholders
may be appointed as the court or the United States trustee deems
appropriate. 71 When equity committees have been appointed, or
when equity has been otherwise represented-for example, by management-the representatives have been instrumental in obtaining
distributions for their equityholder constituents, in spite of any lack of
formal legal entitlement to such distributions under the absolute pri72
ority rule.
Although equity has no real voting leverage, 73 it may extract concessions in a variety of ways. An equityholder may use its position as
a party in interest to obstruct the Chapter 11 process. Professors
LoPucki and Whitford observed in their study a variety of tactics employed by equity:
[I]f others wanted the case to move quickly, equity might threaten delay.
Other tactics by equity included: combing through the financial affairs
of the company looking for matters to litigate; bringing in prospective
purchasers for the company who talked high prices even if they made no
commitments; or threatening to oppose confirmation by presenting evidence on the issue of valuation. 74
Equityholders have also created leverage by calling shareholders'
meetings for the express purpose of electing new boards to replace
debtor management. 75 While there are limits to the permissible scope
69 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994). The United States trustee appoints the committee, which
ordinarily consists of the seven largest unsecured creditors. Id. § 1102(a)(1), (b)(1). The committee may hire attorneys, accountants, and other professional advisers, id. § 1103(a), who are
compensated by the estate. Id. § 330(a)(1).
In many cases, especially smaller cases outside of large metropolitan areas, the committee is
never formed because of a dearth of creditors willing to serve. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY,
supra note 47, 1103.07, at 1103-28. However, this is rarely a problem in the large cases. See
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 48, at 160 (noting that with only one exception, an unsecured
creditors' committee was formed in every case studied).
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1994).

71 Id. § 1102(a).
72 LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 48, at 161. When the debtor is insolvent, its equityholders are usually playing only for some small share in the new equity of the reorganized
debtor.
73 See supra note 64.
74 LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 48, at 161.

75 See, eg., Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 801
F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that shareholders' meeting could not be enjoined absent finding
of clear abuse and irreparable injury).
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of this tactic, 76 it77has been used with some success to improve equity's

plan treatment.

B.

Claims Trading

The basic premise that drives investment in bankruptcy claims is
that the purchaser of a claim, as with the purchase of most other assets, generally succeeds to all the rights of its seller.78 Perhaps the
most important of these rights from the purchaser's perspective is the
right to demand payment in7 9full on the claim, regardless of any discount in the purchase price.

1. Incentives to Trade.-The claim purchaser values the claim
more highly than the seller, hoping to profit either through treatment
76 Id.; see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 29, at 694-95 (discussing "clear abuse"
standard).
77 LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 29, at 697-98.
78 Wilson v. Brooks Supermarket, Inc. (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am., Inc.), 667
F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that store that had cashed payroll checks for debtors' employees was assignee of employees' priority wage claims); Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co. v. Heath (In re
Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co.), 125 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1942) (determining that priority wage claim
remained priority claim after assignment to director and shareholder); In re Zipco, Inc., 157 F.
Supp. 675, 677 (S.D. Cal. 1957), aff'd sub nom. Bass v. Shutan, 259 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1958)
(noting that priority wage claim remained priority claim after assignment to stockholder); In re
Stultz Bros., 226 F. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (A. Hand, J.) (stating that claimant who cashed checks
given by debtor to his employee is entitled to preference as assignee of wage claim); Fortgang &
Mayer, Trading Claims, supranote 13, at 13 n.74 (citing Shropshire, Woodliff & Co. v. Bush, 204
U.S. 186 (1907) (holding that priority wage claims remained priority claims in purchaser's
hands)). But cf. Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.), 868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989) (determining
that debtor could not equitably subordinate bank claim now held by FDIC as successor to insolvent bank, though bank acted inequitably); SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co., 560 F.2d 569 (3d
Cir. 1977) (noting that co-obligor on debt to securities customer was not entitled to customer's
priority when it paid customer's claim).
The claim will generally also suffer the same infirmities and limitations in the hands of the
buyer as it had in the seller's hands. For example, if the claim is subject to avoidance because its
original holder received a preference or a fraudulent transfer of property of the estate, see 11
U.S.C. § 502(d) (1994), or the claim is subject to equitable subordination based on the seller's
inequitable conduct, see 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994), or if the claim is for damages resulting from
the termination of a lease of real property the allowable amount of which is limited by 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(b)(6) (1994), the claim in the purchaser's hands will be subject to the same infirmities and
limitations. See Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 720 (8th Cir. 1942) (stating that assignee is subject
to all equitable claims against assignor).
79 Kremer v. Clarke (In re Frank Fehr Brewing Co.), 268 F.2d 170, 180 (6th Cir. 1959), cert
denied, 362 U.S. 963 (1960); Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Machiewich (In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp.), 149 F.2d 55, 57-58 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 728
(1945); In re Executive Office Ctrs., Inc., 96 B.R. 642 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1988); In re Automatic
Equip. Mfg. Co., 106 F. Supp. 699, 707 (D. Neb. 1952), appeal dismissed sub nom. Automatic
Equip. Mfg. Co. v. Goodall, 202 F.2d 955 (8th Cir. 1953)); Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims,
supra note 13, at 14 n.76 (citing Moulded Prods., Inc. v. Barry (In re Moulded Prods., Inc.), 474
F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
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of its claim under the plan or by reselling its claim at a profit prior to
plan confirmation.
This difference in valuation as between buyer and seller may result from any of several factors. Sellers may be trade creditors or
small, dispersed bondholders, who may not be sophisticated financial
players. They may not be institutionally equipped to follow complex
reorganization cases that may take years to resolve. They may simply
lack the economic stake in the reorganization to justify the costs of
monitoring and actively participating in the case. Their preferred
course may be to cash out at a discount, rather than attempt to deal
with the perceived vagaries of the reorganization process and the financial markets generally. By contrast, the purchaser will very likely
be a professional bankruptcy investor, with the expertise to assess reorganization risk and participate actively in plan negotiation.8 0
The bankruptcy investor, by accumulating multiple claims, may
also realize certain economies of scale. Given its increased stake in
the fortunes of the reorganization as compared to dispersed small
claimants from whom it may have purchased, the bankruptcy investor
can more readily justify the costs of monitoring and participating in
the case. With numerous small claims under common control, the
bankruptcy investor reduces the costs of coordinating action which
would be incurred among disparate creditors. 81
Once a critical mass of small claims is accumulated, the bankruptcy investor becomes a force to be reckoned with in plan negotiation. The investor may, for example, be the only creditor in a class
actively participating in negotiations if the other claims in the class are
small and widely dispersed. This role may allow the investor significant sway over the votes of other creditors in the class. If the investor
buys more than one-third in face amount of the claims in the class, it
80 The purchasers typically are investors who believe they can make a profit by buying the
claims and shares for less than they will yield after confirmation of a reorganization plan.
Some of these investors buy substantial holdings in a particular creditor class. They then
use those holdings to participate aggressively in the reorganization case, either as a committee member representing that class's position or as a holder of claims whose votes will be
necessary if that class is to approve the plan. By acquiring a large amount of claims that will
be exchanged for stock as part of the plan, an investor might even gain control of the emerging company.
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 48, at 162.
81 If claims such as publicly held debentures are widely dispersed, no one holder may have
the incentive to ensure that the interests of the class are fully asserted. By aggregating the
claims, an investor acquires an interest sufficient to warrant exploitation of the bargaining
leverage of the class and the realization of its potential under the reorganization plan.
Id. at 163.
The prospects for appointment of official committees to represent widely dispersed unsecured creditors, see supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text, may possibly provide comparable economy of scale advantages. But see LoPucki, supra note 29, at 249 (discussing the
limitations of committees in Chapter 11).
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holds a blocking position in the class and may effectively veto any plan
not to its liking. 82
Others besides small claimants may also have incentive to sell
their claims. Large institutional creditors may also wish to cash out
early on in the process. In regulated industries like banking and insurance, regulators may require an institution to write down the value of
a particular bankruptcy claim, forcing the institution to show a loss on
its books. If the new lower book value is less than the price for which
the claim could be sold to a bankruptcy investor, then the institution
can actually book a profit by selling, even if at a discount from the
claim's original face value. Therefore, regardless of the institution's
own estimation of its possible recovery in bankruptcy, it has incentive
to sell. Selling the claim also allows the creditor to control the timing
of its loss for tax purposes.
2. The Benefits of Trading.-The benefits available to creditors
from an active market in claims have been well-documented. 83 Provided creditors are given sufficient information to make informed selling decisions, an active market benefits the creditors holding the
marketable claims. The existence of willing purchasers for those
claims allows the fortunate creditors to cash out, whereas their capital
might otherwise be tied up in reorganization for several years. From
this perspective, the bankruptcy investor plays a beneficent role, providing liquidity to those creditors holding claims that provide attractive investment opportunities. 84 In addition, to the extent that the
existence of willing purchasers allows claimants to reduce their bankruptcy losses, claims trading may indirectly reduce overall borrowing
costs. In effect, the bankruptcy investor serves as the risk arbitrageur
of last resort, willing to assume reorganization risks that some creditors would rather avoid. Presumably some of the savings to selling

82 In many cases, the cramdown and non-impairment alternatives may simply not be viable
strategies for the debtor.
83 E.g., Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13, at 4-9; Minkel & Baker, supra
note 13, at 35-37.
84 Of course, the bankruptcy investor does not provide liquidity for the sake of the market
and has no obligation to do so. The liquidity is incidental to the bankruptcy investor's pursuit of
profit. Compare the specialist's role in the stock exchange:
The specialists' responsibilities to trade ... require them ... to temper sudden price movements and keep any general price movements orderly. In this regard, the specialists are
expected to buy for their own accounts to offset order imbalances when the price of their
stock is falling and to sell when the price is rising. This proprietary specialist activity is
expected to alleviate temporary disparities between supply and demand so that advances
and declines will occur smoothly.
SEC STAiF REPORT, Tim OCTOBER 1987 MARKrET BREAK 4-3 (Feb. 1988). See infra notes 26566 and accompanying text.
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claimants from the reduction in bankruptcy losses would be passed on
to borrowers.8 5
Other creditors in the same class with the bankruptcy investor
may also benefit from its presence. Especially in a class of otherwise
small, widely dispersed claims-for example, a class of widely held,
publicly traded bonds-the sophisticated bankruptcy investor holding
a significant block of claims may be the only creditor in the class with
the expertise and economic stake in the reorganization willing and
able to participate actively in plan negotiation. Its ability to negotiate
improved plan treatment for its claims generally redounds to the benefit of all creditors in the class. 86
Claims trading may also hold benefits for debtors and for creditors remaining in the case who do not hold marketable claims. In
some situations, the debtor and nonselling creditors might welcome
the investor's participation. A purchase of claims may be part of a
larger deal that would benefit the reorganization. For example, an
investor may agree during the reorganization to make an equity investment in the reorganized debtor. One way to accomplish this
transaction is for the investor to purchase claims at a discount from
their face amount, and then to receive new stock under the plan as
consideration for the purchased claims. This device effectively cleans
up the capital structure while enabling equity investment in the reor87
ganized debtor.
A professional investor may be more willing and able to accept
new securities as consideration for its claims under a plan. By contrast, the selling claimant may find securities an undesirable form of
plan consideration. A supplier, for example, might not be in the business of buying and selling securities. Even if the securities were liquid, which is not always the case, the typical supplier does not have a
trading desk and may not have the institutional expertise to value securities or to trade them profitably. With illiquid securities, of course,
the problems are even worse.

85 On the other hand, if on balance, trading imposes higher costs on debtors and nonselling

creditors than it avoids for selling claimants, claims trading may increase borrowing costs overall.
86 All claims in a class must receive the same treatment, absent consent of any particular
holder to less favorable treatment. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Situations may

arise in which small claimants are unable to share the potential class-wide benefit created by the
bankruptcy investor. For example, the plan consideration negotiated by the bankruptcy investor
may not be in a form that is useful to small claimants and that cannot easily be liquidated. For
small claimants, equity in the reorganized debtor may not be an attractive form of plan consideration, whereas the bankruptcy investor receiving a controlling block of equity may have a rosier
view.
87 See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
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Creditors in regulated industries-such as banking-may be restricted in their ability to accept or hold securities.88 In this situation,
a bankruptcy investor's involvement indirectly performs a capital raising function for the reorganized debtor. By accepting securities under
the plan in lieu of cash, the investor allows the debtor to retain its
precious cash at confirmation, effectively raising capital for the reorganization effort.89 Conserving the debtor's precious cash improves
the prospects for successful reorganization.
To the extent that relations between the debtor and a major creditor have turned hostile, the hostile claimant's exit and its replacement
by the fresh face of the bankruptcy investor may advance the progress
of plan negotiation. A supplier's willingness to extend postpetition
credit to the debtor may improve if it can mitigate the effect of the
debtor's bankruptcy by liquidating its claim.
The transfer of claims, then, may not only benefit the particular
purchasers and sellers. In some circumstances, it may also promote
the rehabilitative goals of reorganization to the debtor's benefit and
the benefit of the creditors remaining in the case.
3. Formalities and Restrictions on Claim Transfer.-The bankruptcy formalities required in order to transfer claims postpetition are
few and straightforward. Once the substantive deal is reached between buyer and seller, the basic bankruptcy formality is contained in
Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2). 90 It requires that the transferee of a
claim file evidence of the transfer with the court. 91 As long as the
alleged transferor does not file a timely objection after notice from the
clerk, "the transferee shall be substituted for the transferor." 92
The current language is the product of a recent amendment,
which makes clear that only the alleged transferor has standing to object to a transfer.93 The amendment also eliminates the general re88 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,1843(a), (c)(2) (1994); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.140,225.21 (1995) (stating general requirement that nationally chartered banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries of bank holding companies must dispose of stock received in exchange for debt previously
contracted within two years).
89 Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supranote 13, at 8; Minkel & Baker, supra note 13, at
36.
90 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e)(2).
91 Id. This requirement applies only as to outright transfers (not merely for security) after
proof of claim has been filed. Id. For such transfers made before proof of claim is filed, only the
transferee may file the proof of claim. FED. R. BArNK. P. 3001(e)(1). The "evidence of transfer" requirement also does not apply to any claim based on a publicly traded note, bond, or
debenture. FED. R. BANo.m P. 3001(e)(2). Other rules apply to transfer of claims for security.
FE.D. R. BANYP_ P. 3001(e)(3), (4).
92 FED. R. BANKIP. P. 3001(e)(2).
93 H.R. Doc. No. 102-80, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 306-10 (1991) (as amended August 1, 1991).
1703

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

quirement for a hearing and court order to effect a transfer. 94 Several
courts had relied in part on the prior language in the rule95 to condition trading in response to particular perceived abuses. 96 However,
the 1991 amendment to Rule 3001(e)(2) narrows its scope, addressing
97
the rule only to particular disputes between assignor and assignee.
In addition to the filing requirement of Rule 3001(e)(2), section
1126(e) of the Code provides that a party in interest may petition the
court to designate (disqualify) any plan vote that "was not in good
faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance
with the provisions of this title."98 "Good faith" is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Code. However, section 1126(e) has been invoked to disqualify votes of claims purchased immediately prior to the confirmation hearing, when the purchaser's express purpose for buying the
claims was to block confirmation in an effort to acquire control of the
debtor via a competing plan.99 Bad faith designation was also deemed
appropriate in a case in which competitors of the debtor purchased
claims in order to destroy the debtor's business by blocking plan
confirmation. 100
In addition to the constraints of Rule 3001(e) and section 1126(e),
parties in interest have successfully challenged perceived abuses arising from claims trading in particular cases, largely in reliance upon the
court's general equitable powers. For example, creditors have histori94 A hearing and court order are still required if the alleged transferor files a timely objection. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e)(2).
95 Before August 1, 1991, Rule 3001(e)(2) stated:
If a claim other than one based on a bond or debenture has been unconditionally transferred after the proof of claim has been filed, evidence of the terms of the transfershall be
filed by the transferee. The clerk shall immediately notify the original claimant by mail of
the filing of the evidence of transfer and that objection thereto, if any, must be filed with the
clerk within 20 days of the mailing of the notice or within any additional time allowed by the
court. If the court finds, after a hearing on notice, that the claim has been unconditionally
transferred, it shall enter an order substituting the transferee for the original claimant,
otherwise the court shall enter such order as may be appropriate.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e)(2) (amended as of August 1, 1991).
96 For example, in In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) and
In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988), courts concerned about potential informational asymmetries as between assignors and assignees conditioned approval of proposed claim assignments on the taking of remedial measures to provide full disclosure to
assignors. Another court, concerned that claim splitting-assignments that did not transfer assignors' entire interest in particular claims-would increase administrative burdens on the estate, refused to approve assignments until remedial measures were taken. In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc., 119 B.R. 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
97 See generally Fortgang & Mayer, 1991 Developments, supranote 13, at 2; Minkel & Baker,
supra note 13, at 38.
98 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1994).
99 In re Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 289. See infra section III.C.2.
100 In re MacLeod Co., Inc., 63 B.R. 654 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986). See generally Fortgang &
Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13, at 91-99; Andrew Africk, Comment, Trading Claims in
Chapter 11: How Much Influence Can Be Purchasedin Good Faith under Section 1126?, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 1393 (1991).
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cally been able to challenge trading by fiduciaries of the debtor, with
purchased claims being allowed only in the actual amounts paid.10 '
Debtors have also been successful in obtaining orders limiting trading
in cases in which such trading created potential negative tax consequences for those debtors.' 02
On the whole, however, claim transfers have been viewed as private transactions, subject to third-party challenge or court scrutiny
only in special circumstances.
C. Free Alienability of Claims
Free alienability of property has historically been regarded as the
rule, and intervention that impairs or altogether prohibits alienability
the exception.' 0 3 Discussion over transferability of claims in Chapter
11 has generally hewed to this traditional idea. "The freedom to buy
and sell one's property is a right not lightly trammelled upon in this
country. The numerous laws prohibiting restraints on alienation attest
to that."'1 4 Moreover, a claim assignment is generally regarded as a
private transaction between a willing buyer and willing seller, which
"simply substitutes one creditor for another."' 1 5 The assignee merely
"stands in the shoes of the original claimant."'10 6 Therefore, each
claimant should be free to sell, and each purchaser should succeed to
all the rights of its assignor.
Outside of bankruptcy, the analysis goes, a creditor's right to payment is freely transferable, and bankruptcy law should not casually
disrupt prebankruptcy entitlements. 10 7 The oft-cited Butner'0 8 deci101 "Based on the fundamental principle that a fiduciary cannot profit from the trust, courts
have historically held that the claims or interests purchased by fiduciaries may be limited to the
discounted amount paid rather than the full face value of the purchased claim or interest." Scott
K. Charles, Trading Claims in Chapter11 Cases:Legal Issues Confronting the PostpetitionInvestor, 1991 ANN S.JRv. AM. L. 261, 264 (citing In re Gladstone Glen, 739 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (7th
Cir. 1984); Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725, 728 (10th Cir. 1943)); see also In re Papercraft
Corp., 187 B.R. 486 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that allowed amount of claims purchased
by insider was limited to purchase price because of insider's failure to disclose its status prior to
purchase). See generally Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13, at 25 (discussing
historical treatment of fiduciary trading and uncertainties under the Code).
102 See infra section III.C.1.
103 "The assignability of intangible rights is the general rule, non-assignability the exception."
In re Main Town Ctr., 142 B.R. 374,382 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting 7 Cal. Jur. 3d (Rev.),
Assignments § 3 (1989)) (holding that stipulation in single asset bankruptcy, granting relief from
stay to senior secured lender should debtor fail to refinance by a date certain, may be assigned
along with lender's claim).
104 Fortgang & Mayer, 1993 Developments, supra note 13, at 759 (citing U.C.C. § 9-318(4)
(1992); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoN-RncTs § 322(1) (1981)).
105 Minkel & Baker, supra note 13, at 43.
106 Id. at 44.
107 See generally Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A
Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. Rv. 815 (1987) (arguing that because of the problem of forum
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sion succinctly captures the relation between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of
property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves
to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a
party from receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy. 10 9

Commentators have cited Butner for the general proposition that
courts should generally not interfere with the creditor's prebankruptcy
entitlement freely to assign its rights against its debtor-borrower. 110
To the extent that a market develops to facilitate trading in these
rights, this market merely serves to enhance the ability of individual
claimholders to exercise free choice concerning disposition of their
property. Legal intervention should apply only at the fringes of the
market, in order to right specific wrongs or curtail specific abuses. At
its core, the argument goes, the market for claims-like any other
market in which property is bought and sold-functions best when
left alone. The individual acts of rational self-interested actors in the
market will result in desirable outcomes." The public securities markets provide a helpful model of efficiency." 2
shopping, bankruptcy rules should depart from nonbankruptcy rules only if justified by some
specific bankruptcy policy).
108 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
109 Id. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
110 "Until relatively recently, absent the existence of fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching
or violation of fiduciary obligations, courts generally refused to interfere with the transfer of
claims." Charles, supra note 101, at 272 (citing Butner and In re Lorraine Castle Apartments
Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55, 57-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945)).
111 Fashioning judicial "remedies" to deal with the perceived inequities of claims trading
chills the market for claims. ... In an efficient market, the transaction costs and economic
risk imposed on claims purchasers will be shifted to claims sellers through lower prices for
claims.... The imposition of ad hoc rules on claims trading to "protect" selling creditors
effectively taxes those creditors who would like to convert their claims into ready cash.
Absent a complaint of fraud, misrepresentation, or other cognizable wrong from a party
with standing, or a clear congressional mandate, courts should not deprive creditors of the
advantages of claims trading based on judges' personal views of its merits or demerits. Regulation of the marketplace is within the sound discretion of Congress and not an appropriate subject for judicial "legislation."
Minkel & Baker, supra note 13, at 52-53.
112 See, eg., Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13.
[T]he best protection for the unwitting claims seller is an efficient market. The widow from
Dubuque can sell her General Motors stock at a fair price on the New York Stock Exchange
... primarily because there is an active and deep market for her stock.... [T]he market for
claims against chapter 11 debtors is growing stronger.
Id.at 56. See also id.at 46 ("The time may come when this entire area of bankruptcy jurisprudence melts into the securities laws, which would make sense. If claims trade like securities,
regulations of such trading should mimic the securities laws.").
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1. Historical Context: the Bankruptcy Act. -Certainly under
the Bankruptcy Act, 113 the predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code, the
free alienability of claims was assumed. Claims trading was circumscribed only at the margins." 4 Only purchases that involved, for example, bad faith"1 5 or breach of fiduciary duty 1 6 drew censure from
the courts. In the main, however, trading claims in bankruptcy was
simply treated as a free transfer of property from a creditor to a willing purchaser and was presumptively valid. "For over eight decades,
federal courts from the Supreme Court on down have unanimously
held that a claim in the hands of a buyer is no different than a claim in
the hands of a seller. The entire market for claims against Chapter 11
debtors is based on that principle." 117
A review of the reorganization regimes that preceded Chapter
11-Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act-suggests, however,
that free transferability of claims did not have the same disruptive potential for those regimes as does claims trading in Chapter 11. The
respective structures and processes of Chapter X and XI were fundamentally different from those of Chapter 11. In Chapter X, a courtappointed trustee dominated the process. In Chapter XI, the debtor
dominated the process. In either case, creditor influence over the
terms of reorganization of large public companies was far less significant than in Chapter 11. Creditors were not interdependent to the
degree they are in Chapter 11, and relationships and cooperation
among parties in interest were not critical. 118 Claims trading therefore
would not have presented the same problems under those systems.
a. Chapter X-Enacted in 1938 as part of the Chandler
Act,119 Chapter X offered a very highly structured reorganization procedure for large companies with many creditors and complex capital
structures. It was "principally the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission,' 120 designed as a "complete reorganization vehicle"'12 1 to be dominated by public officers and agencies: the
113 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 62-57, 30 Stat. 544-66 (1898) (amended 1938) (repealed 1978) [hereinafter the Bankruptcy Act], reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY, supra
note 47, §§ 1-7031 app. 1.
114 See generally Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13.
115 Id. at 93.
116 Id. at 25.
117 Fortgang & Mayer, 1993 Developments, supra note 13, at 759 (citation omitted).
118 See infra Part II.
119 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840-940 (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549).
120 Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization:
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1335 (1939).
121 Coogan, supra note 56, at 311.
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bankruptcy judge, a court-appointed trustee, and the SEC. 122 The
debtor's management was almost always displaced by a disinterested
court-appointed trustee, 123 who undertook not only to manage the
debtor's business, but also to investigate the financial condition of the
debtor, to report to the judge concerning fraud or mismanagement,2A
and to formulate a plan of reorganization. 125 The trustee was "the
prime agent in the formulation and presentation of a plan of reorganization."'126 All types of debt-secured or unsecured, fixed or contingent-and equity could be modified in a Chapter X plan.
As a substantive matter, Chapter X plans were required to follow
strict absolute priority. 127 "Beginning with the topmost class of claims
against the debtor, each class in descending rank must receive full and
complete compensation for the rights surrendered before the next
class below may properly participate.' 28 Central to the court's absolute priority scrutiny was its going concern valuation of the debtor. 129
This valuation was required in order to determine the value of the
securities issued under the plan and compliance with the absolute priority rule: in particular, whether any class had received more or less
122 Rostow & Cutler, supra note 120, at 1336. Prior to enactment of the Chandler Act, public
company reorganizations under the then-prevailing structures were perceived to have allowed
corporate insiders to divert to themselves reorganization values that rightly belonged to public
investors, primarily public bondholders. At that time, senior bonds were the most common publicly held corporate securities, with equity more often privately held. HousE REPORT, supranote
23, at 222. In reorganization, public bondholders could not effectively organize to protect their
rights against insider equityholders, who along with their investment bankers generally controlled the reorganizations. See generally SEcuarms & ExcI4. COMM'N, 1 REPORT ON THE
STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcrIVrIEs, PERSONNEL & FUNCIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMrI-rEs 243-670 (1937). This control allowed insiders to propose plans of reorganization that favored equityholders at the expense of creditors, who should
have enjoyed priority over equityholders. Id. at 87. In addition, insider control of a reorganization avoided serious scrutiny of the pre-reorganization conduct of management and any lucid
accounting with respect to the company's assets. Id. at 870-71.
Chapter X instituted elaborate procedures and oversight by both the court and the SEC for
the protection of public investors. HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 225. As a result of the
dominant role of public officers, "management and committees controlled either by management or by the house of issue find the area within which they may act to press their interests
correspondingly reduced in size and importance." Rostow & Cutler, supra note 120, at 1336.
123 Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (repealed 1978). For a debtor with liquidated,
noncontingent indebtedness not exceeding $250,000, appointment of a trustee was discretionary.
Id. However, by 1977, such small cases were "exceedingly rare." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23,
at 224 n.23.
124 Bankruptcy Act § 167, 11 U.S.C. § 567(g) (repealed 1978).
125 Id. § 169, 11 U.S.C. § 569 (repealed 1978).
126 Housa REPORT, supra note 23, at 224.
127 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
128 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9 11.06, at 210-11 (14th ed. 1976) (citing Consolidated
Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941)).
129 "The valuation consists of an estimate of the earning power of the reorganized debtor, and
the appropriate market capitalization rate of that estimated income stream." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 23, at 225.

1708

90:1684 (1996)

Claims Trading

than its absolute priority entitlement. The valuation was "employed
to foreclose the interests of junior classes of creditors and stockholders, and no securities [would] be given any class unless all prior classes
[were] 'fully compensated.' "130
The SEC also scrutinized the plan, producing an advisory report
for the benefit of creditors and stockholders.'1323 ' The SEC's report
could take anywhere from one to six months.
Given the structure of Chapter X and the active involvement and
supervision by the trustee, the court, and the SEC, creditors had much
less influence over the process than in Chapter 11. While the trustee
could entertain proposals or suggestions by parties in interest with respect to plan formulation, the trustee was "the key [person] in the
process of arriving at a reorganization plan," who was "under no obligation to adopt any plan or proposal suggested." The trustee had "the
ultimate and sole responsibility;
whatever plan is presented to the
court, it is the trustee's plan."'1 33
Moreover, the significance of creditor voting and creditor opposition to the plan in Chapter X was quite different from Chapter 11. In
Chapter 11, the typical goal of the debtor's management in the plan
formulation process is to scale down senior claims in order to be able
to provide some value in the reorganized debtor to junior claims or
interests. 34 Chapter 11 contemplates the possibility of such a distribution-given that there are few substantive limitations with respect
to the plan distribution scheme 35 -but only with creditor approval.
Only by class vote may creditors agree to take less under a plan than
their absolute priority entitlement. 136 Distribution of value under the
plan is therefore a central focus of debtor-creditor negotiation in
Chapter 11, and creditors may withhold or threaten to withhold their
consent in order to prevent plan confirmation in hopes of negotiating
improved treatment.
By contrast, in Chapter X, holding out by creditors attempting to
improve their plan treatment was less significant an issue. The distribution scheme under a Chapter X plan was constrained by a rule of
strict absolute priority, irrespective of creditor voting. In other words,
absolute priority and creditor approval were separate and independent requirements. Creditor class approval of a plan could not operate
130 Rostow & Cutler, supra note 120, at 1346.
131 Bankruptcy Act § 172, 11 U.S.C. § 572 (repealed 1978). Referral to the SEC was
mandatory for a debtor with indebtedness exceeding $3 million, and discretionary otherwise. Ld.
132 HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 225.
133 6 COLLuER ON BANKRuFrcy Pt. 2, 7.31, at 1285 (14th ed. 1976) (emphasis in original).
Also, unlike Chapter 11, in Chapter X classification of claims was up to the judge. Bankruptcy
Act § 197, 11 U.S.C. § 597 (repealed 1978).
134 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
135 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
136 See supra section I.A.1.
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as a waiver of the absolute priority entitlement of that class, unlike
Chapter 11. Therefore, the nominal value of creditors' claims could
not be scaled down in the plan, even with their consent. Each class
was entitled to full payment before any class with lower priority received any distribution. 137 In addition, the court-appointed Chapter X
trustee was required to be disinterested. The trustee therefore had no
strong stake in attempting to redistribute value from senior to junior
claims via the plan, unlike the Chapter 11 debtor. The Chapter X
trustee's task in formulating the plan was essentially to effect an absolute priority distribution. If that meant that junior claims or interests
were eliminated from participation, then so be it. In Chapter X,
therefore, the plan distribution scheme was simply less susceptible of
negotiation, and creditors therefore had less to gain by opposing the
138
trustee's plan.
The trustee's management of the debtor's business during reorganization also meant that creditor influence over any operational rehabilitation was minimal compared to Chapter 11.
39
In no sense did Chapter X treat creditors as owners of the firm.1
Chapter X did not rely on collective negotiation among private parties
in order to allocate losses or make asset deployment decisions. Instead, it relied on the trustee's plan formulation, following a rule of
strict absolute priority and the trustee's role as the debtor's management. "[A]ll activities in the case are under the sole control of one
40
individual."1
In this context, claims trading could justifiably be described as
merely substituting one creditor for another, without the imposition of
externalities on third parties. Claims trading in Chapter X had far less
potential for disrupting that reorganization process than trading in
Chapter 11.
b. Chapter XI.-Chapter XI was a very different system
from Chapter X. It was envisioned as an informal, inexpensive, and
137 This is not to suggest that valuation is not a speculative process or that widely dispersed
creditors were as effective at asserting their absolute priority entitlements as sophisticated inves-

tors. Professor Coogan's famous bon mot describes the valuation process as "an estimate compounded by a guess." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 225. However, the likely range of
deviation from "strict" absolute priority was certainly much narrower under Chapter X than
under the Bankruptcy Code.

138 Any creditor class rejecting the plan was entitled to "adequate protection for the realization by them of the value of their claims." Bankruptcy Act § 216(7), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (re-

pealed 1978). This latter determination was of course up to the judge. For example, a rejecting
class of creditors could simply be cashed out at the appraised value of its claims. Bankruptcy Act

§ 216(7)(c), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7)(c) (repealed 1978).
139 Cf. infra note 168 and accompanying text.

140 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 235 (explaining relative inactivity of creditors' committees in Chapter X compared to Chapter XI, in part because of limited creditor influence in
Chapter X).
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expeditious process for the arrangement of the unsecured debts of
smaller enterprises. "Chapter XI was designed to eliminate small
businesses ('hot dog stands') from the complications of full-blown corporate reorganization. ' 141 However, it became the reorganization
chapter of choice for large businesses as well as small. 142 It offered a
less cumbersome process than Chapter X and allowed the debtor to
maintain control of the business. 143 Unfortunately, because of its simple structure, it lent itself to debtor domination of the proceeding at
creditor expense. It further proved inadequate for addressing the
complex issues arising in the reorganization of large public companies
with complex capital structures.'"
The debtor largely controlled the process, with little formal oversight by the court or any public officer. In addition to maintaining
control of the business, only the debtor could propose an arrangement 145 or a modification thereof. 146 "It was contemplated that the
debtor would usually be in charge, would sound out the creditors,
would devise a plan, and would try to persuade the creditors to accept
it."'147 Required disclosure to creditors was minimal."4 The un141 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTROOK, TmE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 189
(2d ed. 1991).
142 HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 222. Less than ten percent of all business reorganizations were in Chapter X. Id
143 House REPORT, supra note 23, at 233. Congress did not foresee that major industrial
enterprises would attempt to reorganize under Chapter XI. Quite the opposite. Chapter X included a provision limiting access to those cases in which "adequate relief" was not obtainable
under Chapter XI. Bankruptcy Act §§ 141, 146(2), 11 U.S.C. § 541, 546(2) (repealed 1978).
Chapter XI, however, was the preferred reorganization vehicle. Corporate managers disfavored
the cumbersome Chapter X process, including the SEC's participation and oversight. The attendant delay might ensure the demise of the business. In addition, corporate managers were
reluctant to relinquish their positions of control, especially to a court-appointed trustee unfamiliar with the business. Corporate lawyers also had some influence as to this trend:
The reason underlying the preference of lawyers for Chapter XI is obvious, although not
often stated. A debtor initiates a Chapter XI proceeding, and only the debtor can propose a
plan under Chapter XI. The debtor is normally allowed to operate the business. A concomitant of continued management is the continuation of the employment of the debtor's attorney. On the other hand, if a Chapter X proceeding is initiated, a disinterested trustee is
appointed and counsel for the debtor has a greatly reduced function. Although proponents
of the Chapter XI generally talk about speed and economy, control and the "best interests"
test obviously are the dominating reasons for the preference.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUIcrCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, July 1973, at

247.
144 Formally, only unsecured debt could be affected in Chapter XI. Rights of secured creditors and equityholders were not subject to modification. Bankruptcy Act § 356, 11 U.S.C. § 756
(repealed 1978). This formal limitation in Chapter XI ultimately did not prevent debtors from
modifying the substantive rights of equityholders by diluting their holdings through issuance of
additional equity to creditors as part of their arrangements. HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at
226.
145 Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (repealed 1978).
146 Id. § 363, 11 U.S.C. § 763 (repealed 1978).
147 Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, Affecting Rights to Equity Interests Under Chapter
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 978, 982.
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secured creditors' only involvement was their right to vote for or
against the proposed arrangement. 149 Unlike Chapter X and Chapter
11, creditors in Chapter XI were entitled only to liquidation value.' 50
This allowed stockholders to retain the difference between going concern value and liquidation value.
Together these provisions allowed the debtor to dominate the
Chapter XI proceeding. While negotiation was perhaps more important in Chapter XI than in Chapter X,151 the debtor's exclusive right
to file the Chapter XI52plan basically allowed it to force settlement on
unsecured creditors.
Because the debtor dominated the process, Chapter XI did not
depend heavily on relationships or cooperation among the parties in
interest. Therefore neither the financial restructure nor the business
was significantly affected by changes in the identity or composition of
creditors. 53 Claims trading in Chapter XI could not effect the same
disruption as in Chapter 11.
2. Chapter 11 by Comparison.-Chapter l1's central theme is
54
that the distribution of value is up to the parties' negotiation.
148 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 225.

149 Bankruptcy Act §§ 361, 362, 11 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762 (repealed 1978).
150 HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 223 (citing Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2)
(repealed 1970)).
151 See id at 235 (comparing creditor committee activity in Chapter X and Chapter XI and
significance of creditor influence). Unlike Chapter X, Chapter XI explicitly provided for an
official creditors' committee, whose counsel was compensated from the estate. Id. (citing FED.
R. BANKR. P. 11-29 (1978)).

152 [C]hapter XI gives the debtor the exclusive right to propose a plan. Creditors are excluded. The exclusive right gives the debtor undue bargaining leverage, because by delay he
can force a settlement out of otherwise unwilling creditors, and they have little recourse
except to move for conversion of the case to [C]hapter X. That is contrary to their interests
as it is to the debtor's, and thus is rarely done. The debtor is in full control, often to the
unfair disadvantage of creditors.
HousE REPORT, supranote 23, at 231.
Likewise, while unsecured creditors could move to dismiss a Chapter XI petition, this was
hardly an attractive alternative, especially in the large cases. Dismissal would simply allow secured creditors to capture the lion's share of the debtor's remaining value, leaving little for
unsecured creditors.
153 Perhaps the Chapter XI debtor's worst fear came not from the prospect of recalcitrant
creditors but from the SEC. While the SEC had no formal role in Chapter XI as it did in Chapter X, a common SEC response to the filing of a Chapter XI petition by a large public company
was to move for conversion to Chapter X. E.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. American Trailer
Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
Ultimately, the SEC developed the practice of using this credible threat of conversion to
negotiate with the debtor over the treatment of public debt- and equityholders in the Chapter Xl
arrangement. HousE REPORT, supra note 23, at 223.
154 Klee, supra note 50; Coogan, supra note 56.
Chapter 11, like one of its predecessors, [C]hapter XI, allows and almost compels the parties
to negotiate with each other. While [C]hapter X turned over the reorganization problem to
outside experts-the trustee, the judge, and the SEC-Chapter 11, like [C]hapter XI, leaves
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Chapter 11 was intended to combine all of the best qualities of Chapters X and XI into one all-purpose reorganization statute, while remedying their perceived shortcomings. Chapter X had been deemed too
rigid, both in terms of the structure of the process and the substantive
requirements for the plan of reorganization. Chapter XI allowed the
debtor to dominate the process and provided only incomplete relief
for large public companies because of the inability to modify secured
debt or equity. The negotiation regime of Chapter 11 seemed an appropriate response to these various shortcomings.
However, one issue relating to this more flexible structure, which
was not an issue under Chapter X or XI and which appears to have
received little if any attention, is the possibility of disruption to the
process from active claims trading. Consensus and cooperation were
not as critical in Chapter XI as in Chapter 11, and even less important
in Chapter X. Creditors had less leverage and less interdependence in
proceedings under Chapter X and Chapter XI.
The significant role for creditors and the centrality of bargaining
in Chapter 11 make the process more fragile than either of its predecessor reorganization regimes. Exit of a significant creditor or creditor block, or entry by a bankruptcy investor with its new money
perspective, 155 may significantly alter the course of the reorganization.
Even the prospect of creditor turnover from the collective process
changes the dynamics of negotiation and visits costs on the process. 156
Chapter 11 is therefore less robust than its antecedents with respect to
instability in the creditor constituency.
The pre-Code practice continues to influence contemporary
thinking about claims trading, however. Arguments for free alienability of claims generally rely on pre-Code decisions-some involving
single-asset debtors' 57 -which hold that the face amount and priority
of a claim should generally be respected in the hands of a purchaser,
regardless of any discount on the purchase price. 158 Decisions under
the Code simply echo the pre-Code rule-and even cite to pre-Code
the problem in the hands of those financially interested-the debtor, the creditors, the equityholders, and their committees.
Coogan, supra note 56, at 348.
155 See infra subpart II.C.
156 See infra section II.B.3.
157 In single-asset cases, the debtor's primary asset is overencumbered real estate. The undersecured mortgage holder is the dominant creditor, and general unsecured creditors are relatively
few and their claims relatively small. The debtor and mortgage holder dominate negotiations in
these cases, and general unsecured claims do not exercise much influence. Those claims are
small enough that some nontrivial consideration can usually be allocated to them under any plan
to assure their assent. In this context, the structure of negotiation is relatively uncomplicated.
The possibility of disruption of the process from trading of claims is minimal. Therefore, singleasset cases under the Act supply particularly weak authority for the proposition that claims
should be freely traded in Chapter 11.
158 See supra notes 78-79 and cases cited therein.
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editions of Collier's'59-without analysis
of any relevant distinctions
160
between systems of reorganization.
Because of the differences between reorganization under the
Code and reorganization under the Act, a free trading rule has very
different consequences under the different systems. Pre-Code cases
do not directly address questions of free alienability, free markets, or
externalities, but merely presume a free trading rule. This should not
surprise, of course, since the stakes were different under the Act. A
free trading rule was relatively costless with respect to those reorganization processes. However, without a considered analysis of the effect
of a free trading rule in Chapter 11, these pre-Code decisions should
not be authoritative on this question. The consequences of trading
claims in Chapter 11 differ from the consequences of trading claims in
Chapter X or Chapter XI and from the consequences of selling creditor rights outside of reorganization. A rule of free trading under any
of those other regimes cannot be imported uncritically into Chapter
11.
II.

ADVERSE EF'ECrS OF TRADING ON TIE CONFIRMATION
PROCESS

The literature on claims trading focuses primarily on the benefits
that may derive from trading. 161 The most significant problem, according to this body of commentary, is how to preserve a well-functioning market for claims. Commentators lament bankruptcy judges'
inexplicable tendency to want to regulate the market from the
bench. 162 While some will admit that abuses exist that courts should
address-for example, lack of adequate disclosure or bad faith claims
acquisition and voting-the discussion presumes that the proper
sphere of such "regulation" is at the margins. 163 Fundamentally, however, the market should be unimpeded, so that all parties in interest
may enjoy the benefits of active trading.
159 E.g., In re Executive Office Ctrs., Inc., 96 B.R. 642, 649 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1988).

160 E.g., In re Marin Town Ctr., 142 B.R. 374, 383 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); Executive Office
Ctrs., supranote 159, at 642. In fairness, these two Code cases involved small real estate debtors
with simple capital structures. Claim assignments in those cases did not implicate potential disruption or cost issues. See infra Part II. However, for this same reason, those cases are not
helpful to our inquiry. Small real estate cases do not resemble "megacases" in the structure of
the debtor or the complexity of plan negotiation.

161 See supra section I.B.2.
162 See, eg., discussion, supra note 111 and accompanying text.
163 In regulating the sale of claims in situations like Revere [see supra note 96], the courts
should strike a proper balance. They should preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy process through the zealous protection of those who need it without chilling the markets for
[C]hapter 11 claims by judicially freezing transactions between responsible parties who can
take care of themselves.
Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13, at 56.
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Claims trading is not an unmixed blessing, however. Its generic
effect on the confirmation process has not been examined. Trading
may offer benefits to some, particularly to purchasers and sellers. It
may even expedite a reorganization to everyone's benefit. 164 However, it also has potentially adverse effects to third parties and the
reorganization process. Claims trading effects creditor turnover. The
collective and consensual nature of the Chapter 11 process makes it
susceptible to disruption from this instability in the creditor constituency. Trading may therefore impose costs on the estate and parties in
interest.
This section discusses such detrimental effects on the confirmation process. Based on this discussion, the remainder of the Article
takes issue with the free alienability, market-based account of claims
trading and suggests an alternative approach.
A.

Collective Decisionmaking in Chapter 11

As earlier discussion concerning bargaining in Chapter 11 might
suggest, 165 Chapter 11 effectively creates a participatory, collective
scheme for decisionmaking regarding the terms of reorganization.
This scheme diverges sharply from the prebankruptcy situation.
The ordinary nonbankruptcy debtor-creditor relationship is a bilateral relationship, involving borrower and lender and possibly a limited number of third parties-for example, guarantors. However, as
the borrower approaches financial failure, the relationship between
creditor and debtor becomes more complicated. A given creditor's
recovery begins to depend not only on the debtor's business performance, but on the behavior of the debtor's other creditors. 166 However,
outside of bankruptcy, creditor remedies are generally bilateral in
form. The creditor's state court lawsuit to collect on its debt does not
formally involve other creditors. Each creditor's right to payment
against the debtor stands independent of any arrangement between
the defendant debtor and any of its other creditors. Likewise, each
creditor's collection remedies at state law formally involve only the
debtor, not competing creditors. 167
Invocation of Chapter 11 transforms each creditor's prebankruptcy bilateral relationship with the debtor into a multilateral rela164 See supra section I.B.2.
165 See supra section I.A.2.
166 For example, once the debtor has defaulted on its obligations to its senior secured lender,
the fate of its unsecured creditors to a great extent depends on whether the senior lender responds by foreclosing on its collateral or by working out new terms.
167 Of course, ultimately the winner in the race of the diligent under state law depends on the
field of contestants. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the
State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311, 314-52 (describing various functions
performed by state law collection regime).
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tionship with the debtor and its other creditors. A community of sorts
is created, in which each creditor receives a unique set of bankruptcy
entitlements, armed with which it negotiates with the other community members-the debtor's management, other creditors, the bankruptcy court, equityholders, committees, and the United States
trustee-over a whole range of operational and financial issues, including treatment of its claim under the plan and protection of its interests during the pendency of the case, which for a large publicly
traded company will typically last several years. Commentators have
suggested that Chapter
11 in effect creates a "firm" in which the creditors act as "owners." 168
Over the course of the reorganization, negotiation among the
debtor and creditors effectively remakes the firm. Fundamental
changes are certainly effected in negotiation over the plan. In addition, creditors in Chapter 11 are given oversight over the debtor's significant operational and financial decisions during the case.
Negotiation over these issues may also effect fundamental change in
the firm.
With respect to plan formulation, negotiation among the debtor
and creditors does not simply resolve individual disputes over the distribution of value. Key decisions are made concerning both the reorganized entity's postconfirmation operations and its capital structure.
While each creditor's ultimate concern is treatment of its claim under
the plan, the creditor must also concern itself with the reorganized
debtor's financial and operational health, in order to assure that the
promised plan treatment of its claim will come to fruition.
Instead of using precious cash to satisfy claims, the plan will generally call for the reorganized debtor to issue securities or other instruments evidencing claims against postconfirmation earnings. The
plan will offer to each class of claims a payout different from its
prebankruptcy entitlement. The interest rate may be different; the
term will typically be extended; if secured, the claim's collateral may
be adjusted. In effect, the reorganized debtor satisfies its prepetition
obligations with postconfirmation claims against its projected future
earnings. Because the income stream is limited, one central focus of
plan negotiation for a large public company is the terms of securities
to be issued to each class. By altering the rights of each class of claims
and interests through this negotiation, not only does the plan process
mediate particular conflicts among the parties as to distribution of
value, but it also sets the reorganized entity's capital structure.
168 See, e.g., James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. Rnv. 2097, 2109 (1990)

(suggesting the firm analogy and questioning whether the costs of-administering the firm and
mediating the conflicts among agents and owners may be so high that the firm's formation and
existence cannot be justified).
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Whether these new postconfirmation obligations are ultimately
paid depends not only on the reorganized entity's capital structure but
also on its postconfirmation operations. Parties in interest therefore
will generally want to assure that any operational problems are fixed
under the plan and that the plan is feasible. Disagreements as to how
best to accomplish this goal must be resolved in plan negotiation. For
example, whether an ailing business segment can be revived postconfirmation, or whether it should be sold to raise cash to fund plan payments, is a significant question with both operational and financial
significance, over which parties in interest are likely to disagree. 169
The community of interests in Chapter 11 must address these issues as
well as individual issues of claim treatment.
In addition to the terms of reorganization, each claimant will also
be concerned with the conduct of the ongoing business during the
case. While the debtor is initially charged with managing the business
during reorganization, the scope of its discretionary authority is generally limited to conducting business in the ordinary course. Any nonordinary course use, sale, or lease of estate property or non-ordinary
course incurring of debt requires the debtor to give notice to parties in
interest, who may object and request a hearing. 170 In addition, certain
of the debtor's activities, whether in the ordinary course or not, require notice and a hearing. The debtor's use of cash collateral, 171 the
proposed settlement of any controversy, 172 and payment of professionals retained by the debtor or an official committee' 73 all require
notice and hearing. All sorts of management decisions are subject to
creditor scrutiny. Therefore, it generally behooves the debtor to consider creditors' concerns as part of its business planning. 74
The Code, then, explicitly recognizes the interests of creditors in
the ongoing operation of the debtor in possession and provides for the
mediation of conflicts relating to those operations. Pending confirma169 The divergence in risk preferences as between senior and junior claimants is discussed in
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 29, at 683.
170 "After notice and a hearing," the debtor in possession may use, sell, or lease property of
the estate outside the ordinary course of business, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1994), or may incur
debt not in the ordinary course. Id. § 364. The phrase "after notice and a hearing" is a bankruptcy term of art, which does not necessarily mean that a hearing will actually be held. Id.
§ 102(1). However, in the case of a debtor's proposed non-ordinary course disposition of estate
property, creditors will generally be given some opportunity to object. FED. R. BANKR. P.
2002(a)(2) (stating general requirement that creditors receive 20-days' notice of proposed nonordinary course disposition of estate property).
171 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1994). Cash collateral, see id. § 363(a), is subject to special supervision by the court. It may be used by the debtor only upon authorization of the court after notice
and hearing or by consent of each entity with an interest in such cash collateral. Id. § 363 (c)(2).
172 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).

173 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1994).
174 Conversely, the debtor's management may use its control of the business to exert leverage
over creditors. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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tion of a plan, the creditor's claim entitles it to participate in the oversight of the debtor's business activity to protect its interests.
Over the several years that a large company may be in Chapter
11, significant creditors and the debtor will deal with each other repeatedly, both as to plan negotiation and significant operating issues.
In this fashion, collective decisions are made.
B. Relationships, Cooperation,and the Shadow of Claims Trading
Chapter 11 creates a community of interests by providing a bargaining framework and devices to encourage cooperation among the
various actors in the reorganization. As the community struggles
through its collective decisions, the parties acquire highly specialized
knowledge and experience concerning the debtor company and the
workings of the community. Relationships develop among the actors
within the community. Because the process is collective, and in large
measure consensual, participants develop a certain interdependence
among themselves. These relationships form the foundation for cooperation and are therefore integral to the ultimate success of the
endeavor. 175
Claims trading may destroy these valuable relationships. Major
new creditors may buy into the reorganization; existing creditors may
exit by selling. Relationships must be realigned, squandering the parties reorganization-specific investment and increasing transaction
costs to the remaining parties in interest and the estate. Even the potential for trading deters parties from investing in relationships and
from cooperating. As a result, significant costs may be imposed on
the community and the estate, and ultimately the character of the entity emerging from reorganization may be adversely affected.
1. Relationships in Chapter 1.-Just as the debtor, its customers, suppliers, and employees develop relationships in the course of
the debtor's operations, the debtor and its significant creditors and
committees build relationships throughout the course of the reorganization. Parties interact over plan negotiation; they deal with each
other on a whole host of financial and operational issues. The first
negotiation in Chapter 11 may relate to the debtor's proposed use of
cash collateral or proposed postpetition financing. In large reorganizations, substantive discussion over plan terms may not even begin
until the business is stabilized, a process that may demand the undivided attention of the debtor's management and counsel for several
months. In the meantime, the reorganization community is formed, as
175 For a different account of relationships and community in bankruptcy, see Donald R.
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudenceof Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 717 (1991)
(attacking economic account of bankruptcy and proposing "group therapy" value-based
account).
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parties in interest participate in the initial skirmishes that precede
plan negotiation.
Through these initial skirmishes and subsequent interaction, creditors and the debtor invest in reorganization-specific knowledge and
working relationships. They become educated not only about the
debtor's financial and operational issues, but also about the institutional goals and constraints of other parties in interest and the personal concerns of the individuals assigned to represent such
institutions in the reorganization. The parties in effect invest in each
other, gaining familiarity with their collective decisionmaking process.
An economist would describe this as idiosyncratic investment-highly
specialized and not transferable. 176 Moreover, the investment is specific not only to the reorganization, but also to the particular parties
involved. 177
These relationships are personal. They may or may not turn on
trust or warm feelings for one's competitors. What is critical is the
belief that the parties will encounter one another over and over again
in the course of the reorganization. 178 This belief in the continuity of
176 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governanceof ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. ECON. 233,238-45 (1979) (describing transaction-specific investment in
contractual relations and its significance for determining appropriate governance structure).
177 See id. at 240 (describing transaction-specific human-capital investment in the context of
idiosyncratic supply contracts).
Familiarity... permits communication economies to be realized: specialized language develops as experience accumulates and nuances are signaled and received in a sensitive way.
Both institutional and personal trust relations evolve. Thus the individuals who are responsible for adapting the interfaces have a personal as well as an organizational stake in what
transpires. Where personal integrity is believed to be operative, individuals located at the
interfaces may refuse to be part of opportunistic efforts to take advantage of (rely on) the
letter of the contract when the spirit of the exchange is emasculated. Such refusals can serve
as a check upon organizational proclivities to behave opportunistically. Other things being
equal, idiosyncratic exchange relations which feature personal trust will survive greater
stress and display greater adaptability.
Ld.
Chapter 11 in essence replaces the debtor's multiple bilateral prebankruptcy obligations
with a sort of multilateral relational contract. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nv. U. L. Rav. 854 (1978). Parties' interaction in Chapter 11 exhibits the three significant factors distinguishing relational contracts from traditional discrete transactions: uncertainty, recurring exchange among the parties, and transaction-specific investment. See
Williamson, supra note 176, at 239. While any prebankruptcy obligation might simply have been
a discrete "right to payment" against the debtor, a Chapter 11 claim represents far more. Cf. 11
U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994). It allows participation in Chapter 11's "political and social processes"
that adjust each claimant's rights. Any discrete prebankruptcy rights to payment are replaced by
multiple relations that create "a minisociety with a vast array of norms beyond the norms centered on exchange and its immediate processes." Macneil, supra,at 901.
178 In a related context, Robert Axelrod made the following observation:
[O]nce a manufacturer begins to go under, even his best customers begin refusing payment
for merchandise, claiming defects in quality, failure to meet specifications, tardy delivery, or
what-have-you. The great enforcer of morality in commerce is the continuingrelationship,
the belief that one will have to do business again with this customer, or this supplier, and
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the interaction-the relationship-is important for the ultimate success of the endeavor. Relationships facilitate cooperation. Cooperation enables mutually beneficial outcomes that might not otherwise be
possible. A cooperation theorist tells us:
The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of
the relationship.... Whether the players trust each other or not is less
important in the long run than whether the conditions are17ripe
for them
9
to build a stable pattern of cooperation with each other.

2. Transaction Costs from Claims Trading.-Reorganization is
complex and expensive under the best of circumstances. 8 0 If in addition to the existing complexity of this multiparty bargaining game, significant creditors or creditor groups sell out, or new participants enter
with no prior connection to the debtor or the ongoing negotiation, the
complexity of the process is magnified significantly.

A special sort of firm-specific capital, unique to the reorganization, is lost when a significant creditor exits by selling out or enters by
buying in.181 When a significant creditor sells out, its accumulated
knowledge of the case becomes useless. 182 Prior negotiation may have
been for naught. Relationships with that exiting creditor are destroyed, squandering the parties reorganization-specific investment.
when a failing company loses this automatic enforcer, not even a strong-arm factor is likely
to find a substitute.
ROBERT M. AXELROD, THm EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 60 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting
M. MAYER, THE BANKERs 280 (1974)).
179 Id. at 182.
180 A reorganization.., involves a very complicated bargaining game in which many claimants try to maximize their own self-interest. The fear that a firm is or may soon become
insolvent causes various claimants on the firm to engage in behavior that is not joint wealth
maximizing. The inability of all involved to work together collectively often leads to protracted negotiations that have enormous transaction costs in terms of professional fees.
Even more importantly, during this period, the current operations of a company can be
severely hampered. Relations with customers, suppliers, and bankers can all be disrupted.
Attention may be diverted and the quality of service may decline. Key employees may
leave, and a vast amount of firm-specific capital may be lost because of uncertainty about
the structure or needs of the reorganized firm.
Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargainingand Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295, 313 (1989).
181 The two do not necessarily happen simultaneously. A bankruptcy investor can become a
major creditor in the reorganization by aggregating small claims, without having to purchase
from an existing major creditor. Conversely, a major bondholder could simply liquidate its holdings in the public securities market, effectively replacing itself in the reorganization with widely
dispersed new claimants. Even assuming sufficient liquidity in the public markets, the selling
bondholder will almost certainly take a loss with this strategy, since with large blocks of securities in the secondary markets, the sum of the parts is generally worth less than the whole. The
selling bondholder could generally achieve a higher recovery by selling its holdings in a block in
a private transaction-provided a buyer could be found. Flooding the market would also cause
the market price to drop, further depressing the selling bondholder's overall recovery.
182 This wasted reorganization-specific capital affects not only the exiting creditor. To the
extent other parties invested in that exiting creditor's accumulated knowledge, e.g., by educating
that creditor about the debtor's business, their investment is also wasted.
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Relations among the remaining creditors must be realigned to account
for the exiting creditor's absence. Likewise, when a significant creditor buys in, it must be integrated into the community, and relationships must be realigned.
Realigning relationships and integrating a new significant creditor
into the community require additional investment by the parties in
interest.'8 3 For instance, a professional bankruptcy investor may take
an approach to reorganization very different from that of a bank with
a long lending history with the debtor. When the bank sells its claim
to the bankruptcy investor, the debtor and other parties in interest
may need to adjust their expectations, goals, and respective approaches in negotiation. The bankruptcy investor may not value the
prospect of a continuing corporate client postconfirmation, as the selling bank claimant would have. The bankruptcy investor may not be
interested in providing postpetition or postconfirmation financing to
the debtor, as the bank might have. The bankruptcy investor may not
be interested in receiving its plan consideration in the form of banktype debt-that is, a collateralized floating rate privately held note. 184
All other parties in interest have a stake in these differing goals as
between buying and selling claimants. The form of plan consideration
affects the debtor's capital structure. The exit of a prospective postconfirmation lender means that new postconfirmation financing must
be found. Parties in interest must forge relationships with the new
entrant and adjust to new issues that arise.
Committees pose special problems in this regard. The creditors'
committee is charged with fiduciary duties to its constituent creditors. 185 It is meant to play a watchdog role: overseeing the debtor's
operations, investigating the debtor's financial dealings, representing
unsecured creditors in plan negotiation, and possibly moving for appointment of a trustee or examiner. 186 The committee is meant to be
a "key player" in the reorganization process. 187
Claims trading may destabilize committees. Committee members
who sell their claims will generally resign once they have sold, and
purchasers may attempt to get appointed to committees. 8 8 The Code,
183 Resentments may be created, both toward any "deserter" and any late entrant. Because
of the collective nature of the process, all creditors have an important stake in the composition
of the community. However, they have no say in the exit of a selling claimant or the identity of
any new participant, the size of its stake, or the timing of its entrance into the case.
184 See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
185 5 COLLIER ON BANKRurcy, supra note 47, 1103.07, at 1103-26.
186 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1994).
187 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuprcy, supra note 47, 1103.07, at 1103-27.
188 See, eg., Anthony Baldo & Everett Clayton, Hills Talks Go Silent, but Heavy Claims Trading Continues, MERGERS & Acouis oNs REPORT, May 4, 1992, at 1, 14 (noting that in bankruptcy of Hills Department Stores, Inc., committee members sold their claims and then resigned,
and that purchasers had applied to be on committee).
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however, contains no explicit provision governing removal of committee members or reconstitution of a committee. 8 9 Instability in and
uncertainty with respect to a committee's composition, or outright
turnover of influential members, may cause confusion as to a committee's previous strategies, positions, and promises. It may be unclearto committee members as well as other parties in interest-who
speaks for the committee. Committee counsel and other professionals
may be unsure to whom they should look for direction. Committee
infighting may arise. In any event, the disruptive potential is evident.
Given the committee's critical role in reorganization, chaos in the
committee may easily lead to more generalized chaos in the
reorganization.
In addition to the new relational and other reorganization-specific investments that may be required as a consequence of claims
trading, there are other cost implications. If prior negotiations are
rendered meaningless by the exit or entry of a new significant participant, the reorganization may be prolonged, increasing the expense to
the estate. In the large cases, professional fees alone will consume
significant estate assets. The estate must pay fees and expenses for
lawyers, accountants, appraisers, investment bankers, and other professionals retained by the debtor and official committees. 190 These
costs are ultimately passed on to creditors in the form of lower recoveries in bankruptcy. To the extent that interjection of a new participant or exit of an existing player requires retrading of deals already
struck, or significant redirection of negotiation, administrative expenses for past negotiations were for naught. 191 Retrading deals in
response to significant claims trading will impose additional costs on
all remaining participants. 192
This delay from prolonged and redirected negotiation hurts the
business as well. The debtor's management has two major tasks in
Chapter 11-running the business and negotiating the plan. The
longer the case takes, the greater the diversion of management attention from running the business. The cost implications are not limited
to out-of-pocket costs; prolonging the case imposes opportunity costs.
Professors LoPucki and Whitford observed a pattern of conservative
investment behavior by management of Chapter 11 debtors.193 They
found that for the duration of the Chapter 11 proceeding, manage189 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47,
190 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1994).

1102.01[6], at 1102-25.

191 One prominent attorney estimates that significant renegotiation occurs in 98% of the
cases in which bankruptcy investors become involved. Telephone interview with Harvey R.
Miller, Esq., Partner, Weil, Gotshal, and Manges (Apr. 4, 1995).

192 This effect is greater, of course, the longer the case has been going. Trading shortly after
the case has been filed will generally not have the same impact as significant creditor turnover
after several years of plan negotiation.

193 LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 29, at 749.
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ment generally follows a path of "prudent investment,"' 94 avoiding
risky new investment that would have adverse distributional effects on
certain classes of claims and interests, in favor of simply preserving
the existing business. 195 Debtors with particular strategies for acquisition of new businesses or companies believed that implementation of
these strategies would have to wait until the debtors had emerged
from bankruptcy. 196 To the extent that this "holding pattern" mental-

ity causes debtor management to adopt too conservative an investment strategy and forego new business opportunities that might
maximize the value of the estate, all parties in interest lose.
With delay, much traditional firm-specific capital may be lost, as
employees, suppliers, and customers defect. The bankruptcy filing itself will cause many who dealt with the debtor in the past to abandon
even long-term relationships with the debtor.197 These relationships
are valuable to the debtor and will be difficult and costly to replace.
Even for those initially willing to stick with the debtor in bankruptcy,
the disruption and uncertainty caused by significant trading may cause
their eventual defection. Depending on the timing of the trading, exit
of a major creditor or entry of the bankruptcy investor may throw
existing negotiations into disarray, causing confusion as to the fate of
the business and eroding the debtor's ability to salvage key long-term
relationships.
3. Cooperation in the Shadow of Claims Trading.-Even the
possibility that claims may be traded may have detrimental effects on
the reorganization. The potential for significant trading modifies the
shadow under which bankruptcy bargaining occurs. The perception of
ready exit opportunities discourages all parties from adopting the
long-term perspective necessary for development of relationships,
upon which cooperation depends. 198
If a creditor perceives that it may likely be able to settle with a
third party for a sum certain as consideration for its claim, its incentive
194 Id.

195 Id. at 778.
196 Id. at 749.
197 Bankruptcy sends a signal to everyone dealing with a bankrupt debtor "Get out now

with as much as you can as fast as you can." With respect to the bankrupt debtor, bankruptcy suggests that there is no long-term worth worrying about. Suppliers are less likely to
ship for fear of not getting paid. Customers are less likely to order for fear of not being able
to rely on the debtor's existence, much less the debtor's timely performance. Employees
and managers become nervous and less faithful and may leave.
Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the Administrative State, 50 LAw & CorrTaEP. PROBs.,
Spring 1987, at 3, 33.
198 "The evolution of cooperation requires that individuals have a sufficiently large chance to
meet again so that they have a stake in their future interaction." Axelrod, supranote 178, at 20.
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to cooperate is diminished considerably. 199 Pending exploration of its
exit opportunities, the potential seller may be unwilling even to
devote resources to participating in the process. Relationships fail to
develop. Cooperation among the parties becomes difficult. If this potential seller happens to be a significant claimholder, its recalcitrance-or outright indifference to the progress of reorganizationcan seriously undermine the reorganization effort.
This short-term perspective will afflict all parties, even those
without any realistic prospect of exiting by selling. The debtor and
others that know they are in for the long haul will be less willing to
cooperate with creditors who may be gone tomorrow. The prospect of
having to retrade the same deal with a new creditor dampens everyone's enthusiasm for finding mutually acceptable solutions to the myriad issues that arise in the several-year course of the reorganization.
The mere perception of the availability of this exit option serves to
make all creditors more recalcitrant, and to make debtors less willing
to compromise. Relationship building and the fruits of cooperation
are sacrificed to the short-term perspective.200
The opportunity for a quick exit tends to frustrate in a fairly direct way the rehabilitative goals of bankruptcy. As Professor Eisenberg has noted, the Code includes many devices for fostering
relationships and enhancing cooperation among the parties. 201 For example, bankruptcy law provides incentives for creditors to continue to
deal with the debtor in Chapter 11. Administrative expense priority
encourages extension of postpetition credit to the debtor.202 The
debtor's prepetition lenders and suppliers are thereby given incentive
not only to hope for the debtor's survival as a going concern, but also
to finance its recovery and increase their stake in the reorganization.
199 Upon initial consideration, it might appear that for holders of publicly traded debt, this
"easy exit" effect exists independent of bankruptcy. That is, the public markets would provide
an easy exit whether a bankruptcy system existed or not. However, as a practical matter, for any
holder of a large block of public debt, exit via the public markets is less than ideal. A more

profitable method of exiting would be to negotiate a private deal for the entire block. See supra
note 183.

Because Chapter 11 enhances the marketability of such a block, see infra subpart III.A, the
attractiveness and availability of a private exit may be improved by the fact that Chapter 11
exists. Therefore, while the "easy exit" problem of reduced cooperation would exist with respect
to public debtholders independent of Chapter 11, it is probably more pronounced because of
Chapter 11.
200 Cf. Williamson, supra note 176, at 241 (noting that assurance of a continuing relation is
necessary to encourage idiosyncratic-transaction-specific, nonnarketable-investment).
201 Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy". Bankruptcy and
Bargaining,75 VA. L. REv. 205,208 (1989). "If the foundation of cooperation is not merely trust
but is also, as a cooperation theorist puts it, 'the durability of the relationship,' bankruptcy law
may be seen as trying to foster 'a stable pattern of cooperation' with the attendant payoffs that
cooperation yields." Id- at 217.
202 11 U.S.C. §§ 364, 503(b)(1), 507(a)(1) (1994).
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Priorities for prepetition 20 3 and postpetition wage claims 204 likewise
encourage employees to stick with the debtor through the reorganization. The provisions concerning executory contracts force third parties who dealt with the debtor prepetition to continue to deal with the
debtor postpetition.205 Keeping these parties in the reorganization
"can lead to bargaining conversations that might not exist absent
'20 6
these provisions.
Bankruptcy law also contains devices for keeping secured creditors and their collateral involved in the reorganization. The automatic
stay initially prevents the secured creditor from exiting with its collateral. 20 7 In addition, other provisions in the Code render uncertain the
secured creditor's entitlements in bankruptcy. The amount of its secured claim20 8 and its hopes of obtaining relief from stay20 9 both de210
pend on valuation of its collateral, always a speculative endeavor.
This uncertainty, along with the indefiniteness of the adequate protection standard, encourage the secured creditor to bargain with the
debtor. If its entitlements were clear in bankruptcy, the secured credi211
tor would be encouraged to stand on its rights and not to bargain.
Chapter 11 supplies numerous incentives for the parties to bargain, and the bargaining conversations that occur over the course of a
complex reorganization lead to the establishment of relationships,
which are critical to cooperation.
If people must get along for a minute, they may do so, but they have
little incentive to probe for mutually beneficial transactions. If they
must get along for a year, they have dramatically different incentives. If
long-term relationships generate cooperative behavior, and cooperative
behavior yields economic payoffs, then long-term relationships may be
203 Ld.§ 507(a)(3).
204 Id. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(1).

205 Id. § 365.
206 Eisenberg, supra note 201, at 209. In the context of utility bankruptcies, Professor Eisenberg summarizes the likely effect of keeping the players in the game:
The inability of the debtor's relations immediately to extricate themselves from involvement
with the debtor becomes a reality unto itself. The debtor's relations must think in terms of
long-term interactions because they find themselves in a long-term relation. The "get-outnow" mentality is cushioned by planning in light of the new, longer relationship with the
debtor. All parties have increased incentives to discover mutually beneficial transactions.
The payoff is a larger pie for all of the relations to share.
Eisenberg, supra note 197, at 36.
207 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
208 Id. § 506(a).
209 Id. § 362(d).
210 "Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
211 "Bankruptcy law promotes bargaining by creating uncertainty about participant rights.
The secured creditor who 'knows' that it is entitled to a particular amount in bankruptcy has
little incentive to bargain. The uncertainty that bankruptcy creates about such a creditor's rights
... brings the creditor to the bargaining table." Eisenberg, supra note 201, at 209.

1725

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
normatively desirable.... [O]ne important task of a bankruptcy law may
be to convince the debtors' relations that there is a long term worth worrying about or at least to raise the cost212to the debtor's relations of disentangling themselves from the debtor.
To the extent that it is perceived that certain creditors may not have a
long-term worth worrying about, the benefits of cooperation are denied to the estate.
C.

The Bankruptcy Investor

The adverse consequences from an unstable creditor constituency
suggest generic problems of changing horses in midstream, which has
historically been recognized as problematic.21 3 With claims trading,
the nature of the new horse should also be considered. The creditor
that enters a case by purchasing claims typically differs from the selling claimant in important ways. The purchasing creditor is usually a
214
professional bankruptcy investor; the selling claimant usually is not.
Unlike most other creditors, the bankruptcy investor typically had no
interaction or relationship with the debtor prior to its entry into the
case, and it typically does not contemplate long-term involvement
with the reorganized debtor once the case is over. The professional
bankruptcy investor brings with it an economic perspective and legal
and financial sophistication that inform all its activities in the reorganization-its entry into the case, its behavior during the case, and its
exit-changing the dynamics of the community in fundamental ways.
The bankruptcy investor's very entry into the case sets it apart
from other creditors. At a very basic level, its economic perspective
differs from the perspective of the ordinary bankruptcy creditor. The
selling creditor, by selling, has unmistakably evidenced its desire to
strike a deal quickly and a willingness to settle at a discount. By contrast, the professional bankruptcy investor has invested new money
with the intent of realizing a profit. It must insist on a higher consideration for its acquired claim than it paid. The selling creditor would
have settled for less; in fact it did so. By contrast, given its fine appreciation for the time value of money, the investor knows that the longer
the process takes, the greater a recovery it must secure in order to
make the investment worthwhile. Far from expanding the common
ground for agreement on plan treatment, then, the introduction of this
new money perspective into plan negotiations may have a ratcheting
212 Eisenberg, supra note 197, at 35.
213 See, e.g., DAN FOGELBERG, Changing Horses, on SouvFNms (Epic Records 1974)
("Changing horses in the middle of a stream gets you wet and sometimes cold.").
214 While selling claimants may sometimes be sophisticated financial institutions, selling is
probably more common for trade creditors or public debt holders.
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effect.215 Unlike the exiting creditor, which has resigned itself to taking a loss, the bankruptcy investor, with its new money basis in its
investment, will not easily agree to plan treatment that fails to produce an acceptable return. The bankruptcy investor's perspective is
not one of damage control but profit maximization. 216 To the best of
its ability, the investor will attempt to cut a tougher economic deal
with the debtor than the selling creditor would have. 217 This effect is
magnified, of course, with the bankruptcy investor's purchase of multiple claims.
The bankruptcy investor will generally purchase claims strategically, in order to maximize its leverage in plan negotiation. 21S What
any particular claim gets paid at the end of the day, and the overall
distribution of value among competing claimants, depend on many
factors besides the face amounts of claims. The relative negotiating
skill and bargaining power of claimholders are critical. The elaborate
plan bargaining framework 219 suggests that by purchasing strategi215 "The [claim] acquiror's objective of achieving a stupendous return on investment colors all
of its actions." Letter from Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Partner, Weil,Gotshal and Manges, to Frederick Tng, Associate Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law (Apr. 17,
1995) [hereinafter Miller Letter] (on file with author). See generally Stephen M. Bundy, Commentary on "UnderstandingPennzoil v. Texaco": Rational Bargainingand Agency Problems, 75
VA. L. REV. 335 (1989) (discussing the concept of a "positive settlement gap" and the factors
affecting likelihood of settlement).
216 The bankruptcy investor's business depends on its profits from investment in Chapter 11
claims. By contrast, the selling creditor and other creditors remaining in the case are unlikely to
be in the bankruptcy investing business or the collections business; they operate other commercial pursuits from which they derive profit. Therefore, ordinary creditors generally will not have
the bankruptcy investor's aggressive profit motive with respect to their bankruptcy claims. Instead, they will simply seek to minimize their losses.
217 It has been suggested that the bankruptcy investor entering the reorganization process
may be more solicitous to the process than the exiting seller. Having invested new money, the
entering investor appreciates more seriously the time value of money and is therefore more
eager than its predecessor to strike a deal quickly. Because it has purchased at a discount from
face, the new entrant also has a lower basis in the investment, and therefore may have more
flexibility as to the terms of an acceptable deal. Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note
13, at 6-7.
This argument fails to appreciate the selling creditor's position. While the selling creditor
may have been carrying its claim on its books at par, sale of its claim at a discount clearly
evidences its willingness to compromise its claim. There may be other reasons why the substitution of the new participant into the plan process moves the process forward, but the simple
economics of the trading transaction do not support such an assertion.
218 See, e.g., Margaret A. Elliott, The Wonderful World of Bankruptcy, INSTrrtuTONAL INVEsTOR (Int'l ed.), Nov. 1988, at 66 ("You have to pick the instrument with the most leverage and be
prepared to fight for your rights in a reorganization or bankruptcy.") (quoting Shelley Greenhaus, Senior Vice President of Oppenheimer & Co.); John Cassidy, America's Top Stories Reopen Hostilities, SuNDAY ThMEs, Jan. 9, 1994 ("My guiding philosophy is that you really need to
get into a controlling position in Chapter 11 and really be able to dictate what your stakes in the
outcome will be.") (quoting Daniel Harmetz, Manager of Fidelity Investment's Capital and Income Fund).
219 See supra subpart I.A.
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cally, the bankruptcy investor can acquire not merely a seat at the
negotiation table, but a good seat. It can establish a position of great
leverage, for example, by acquiring more than one-third in face
amount of the claims in a class. With this blocking position in the
class, it can basically prevent class acceptance of any plan not to its
liking.220 Only by rendering the class unimpaired or by paying the
class its absolute priority entitlement may the debtor confirm a plan
over the dissent of the blocking bankruptcy investor.221 Even without
invoking the absolute priority rule, the claimant holding222a blocking
position in a class can divert significant value to its class.

The professional bankruptcy investor's sophistication means a
more formidable presence in negotiation generally, with respect to
both the plan and the other collective decisions of the community. To
the extent that the exiting claimant or claimants were widely dispersed
or lacked the economic stake or institutional backing to hire sophisticated legal and financial advisers, the bankruptcy
investor's entry
223
changes the overall complexion of the case.

The bankruptcy investor may be able to create leverage in more
imaginative ways than by simply purchasing a blocking position in a
class. For example, by acquiring claims, bankruptcy investors have
purchased standing to bring suit against other parties in interest on
colorable legal claims. These investors used 224
their threat of litigation
as leverage to improve their plan treatment.
Unlike trade and bank creditors, which had relationships with the
debtor prebankruptcy and which will likely continue to do business
with the reorganized debtor postconfirmation, the bankruptcy investor often retains no interest in the reorganized debtor's long-term via220 See, eg., Stephen E. Clark et al., The Black Prince of Wall Street, INSTrrUtONAL INvEsTOR, Aug. 1991, at 15 (explaining blocking strategy of bankruptcy investors: "Apollo (like Water
Street, Icahn and others) is what's known as a blocking creditor.... It ... buys enough of any

one class... to give it so-called blocking power.... Apollo acquires veto power over a reorganization by buying up more than one third of a class.").
221 While confirmation based on new value is a theoretical possibility, see generally In re Bon-

ner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing new value exception to absolute
priority rule), cert. granted sub nom. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,
114 S. Ct. 681, motion to vacate denied and dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994), its application is

unlikely in the reorganization of large public companies.
222 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Koruhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: the
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing effect of formal legal entitlements on infor-

mal bargaining).
223 As a veteran bankruptcy investor described, "[w]e acquire as much of the senior securities
as necessary to prevent a company from reorganizing-unless we say so." Kate Campbell, Vulture Capitalists:Investment Activities Taking Advantage of Troubled Firms, CAL. Bus., Jan. 1993,
at 36, 40 (quoting Martin J. Whitman).
224 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 48, at 163, for war stories of investors purchasing
positions in junior debt, then successfully developing: (1) a fraudulent transfer action against
bank creditors (Saxon Industries), and (2) a breach of indenture covenant action against a debtor
(Wilson Foods), to extract improved plan consideration.
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bility. Instead, its investment strategy will include provision for a
quick exit, sometimes even before the plan becomes effective. The
bankruptcy investor will often negotiate for plan consideration in the
form of publicly tradeable securities, or some other debt instrument
for which an active private market exists and which can be "flipped"
close to confirmation32 In this situation, rehabilitating the debtor
company only matters to the extent it affects pricing of the bankruptcy
investor's postconfirmation securities. The terms of the securities are
22 6
critical; the reorganization itself merely serves as a marketing tool.
The bankruptcy investor's short-term, quick exit perspective may
have adverse consequences for the debtor and other creditors. With
its sophistication and its purchased leverage, the bankruptcy investor
usually exerts significant influence over the terms of reorganization.
Its effectiveness in leveraging the reorganization process means that
any plan that emerges may have to compromise the debtor's longterm viability for the bankruptcy investor's short-term return 2 7
Claims trading therefore not only tends to destroy relationships already established, but the new ones forged with the bankruptcy investor may not favor a lasting rehabilitation for the debtor.
1II. THE

CASE FOR LIMITING TRANSFERABILITY OF CLAIMS

Even given the potential adverse effects of claims trading on
Chapter 11's collective process, there remains the fundamental ques225 For example, fixed-rate, medium-term notes sell well to insurance companies and other
financial institutions looking to fund payments on fixed-rate obligations such as annuities.
It is not uncommon for the bankruptcy investor to be able to liquidate its new securities
even before they are issued. Once the capital markets reach some level of comfort that the
terms of the reorganization securities are set, it is common for reorganization securities to trade
on a "when-issued" basis. See, eg., Gautam Naik, Lone Star IndustriesReady to Emerge From
Chapter11; Troubled Cement Maker Hopes Many of Its Problems Are Behind It, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 1994, at B4 (discussing trading of stock of reorganized debtor on when-issued basis);
Dana Milbank, LTV's New Common, to Begin Trading Soon, CarriesMore Than Just Post-Chapter 11 Risks, WALL ST. ., June 18, 1993, at C2.
226 It should be noted that not all bankruptcy-claim purchasing is done for the purpose of
short-term financial speculation. Investors have also used claim purchasing as a vehicle to effect
long-term investment in a reorganizing company. For example, in the bankruptcy reorganization
of R.H. Macy & Co., its competitor, Federated Department Stores, Inc., purchased $500 million
in face amount of secured claim against Macy's as part of Federated's strategy-ultimately successful-to acquire Macy's. See also infra note 324. See generally Cassidy, supra note 218
(describing Federated's purchase of secured claim against Macy's as part of acquisition strategy).
This type of transaction raises interesting and important issues that are unfortunately beyond the
scope of this Article.
227 "The acquiror generally has no long-term perspective and is not particularly concerned
about economic viability after its contemplated departure from the scene from a capital markets
exit or otherwise ....
[F]rom my perspective, there are a significant number of Chapter 11
debtors compelled to emerge from Chapter 11 before the illness that precipitated the Chapter 11
case is cured." Miller Letter, supra note 215, at 2.
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tion whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances circumscription of claims trading may be appropriate.
Buying distress debt at a discount is not a new investment strategy.228 The negative effects of claims trading may simply be costs of

living in a system in which economic rights are generally freely alienable. One might wonder what is special about Chapter 11 such that
rights of creditors to assign their claims should be curtailed. In some
cases, trading not only benefits buyer and seller, but may promoteor at least not inhibit-the rehabilitative goals of reorganization. 2 9
Even230for those cases in which trading may be inimical to reorganization, we must consider nonbankruptcy values and interests that may
be implicated. Claims deserve at least the initial presumption of free
alienability so fundamental to our notions of private property and individual liberty. The basic bankruptcy policy of minimizing bankruptcy's infringement of creditors' rights outside of bankruptcy must
be considered.231
In this Part, a general justification for limiting transferability of
claims is developed. The following Part proposes certain equitable relief from adverse effects of claims trading.
A.

Claims and PrebankruptcyEntitlements

Claims are bankruptcy-created bundles of rights reflecting Chapter l1's unique approach to collective settlement of multiple obligations. While the substantive right to payment derives from each
creditor's prebankruptcy entitlements, Chapter 11 creates the critical
procedural rights that replace nonbankruptcy enforcement rights and
enable each creditor to participate in determining its ultimate recovery. Moreover, it is the imposition of Chapter 11 from which claims
derive their value as marketable commodities. Because Chapter 11
creates the bundles of rights and gives them value-which they lack
outside of Chapter li-it is argued that trading may justifiably be circumscribed when it frustrates the reorganization process and threatens to undermine achievement of the rehabilitative goals for which
228 Fortgang and Mayer recount the story of the members of the First Congress buying up war
bonds issued by the states to fund the Revolutionary War. Members bought at a deep discount
while they were also considering legislation to have the new federal government assume these
liabilities and pay the bonds in full. The legislation passed, but because the debt purchasing

members were primarily from northern states, critical votes of southern congressmen were obtained only by the northerners' promise to move the capital to a site between Maryland and
Virginia on the Potomac River. Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13, at 25-26
(citing C. BowERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: TE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
43-48, 64-67 (1966)).

229 See supra section I.B.2.
230 See supra Part It.
231 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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Chapter 11 was intended. These goals should take precedence over
general notions of free alienability of economic rights.
A Chapter 11 claim is an unusual asset. Its attributes are largely
a creation of the bankruptcy system, designed to help facilitate reor23 2
ganization while preserving the debtor's going concern value.
Claimants' bundles of rights are uniquely tailored to, and inextricably
linked with, Chapter 11's collective, consensual process. The bundles
of rights enable claimants to participate in this process.
As to each creditor's bankruptcy entitlements, underlying substantive prebankruptcy rights are certainly discernible. The face
amount of the claim, of course, derives from the debtor's prebankruptcy obligations to the creditor, and a claim's secured status generally depends on prebankruptcy arrangement. 233 However, while the
bankruptcy bundle of rights is based on prebankruptcy entitlements,
once in bankruptcy, the creditor's right to payment becomes something far more complex.
Chapter 11 alters each creditor's prebankruptcy rights in fundamental ways. Certain prebankruptcy entitlements are eliminated, and
other entitlements unique to Chapter 11 are appended. Once in bankruptcy, creditors are no longer entitled to pursue individual remedies
in nonbankuptcy fora or seize the debtor's assets in satisfaction of
debts even justly owed.23 4 The race of the diligent outside of bankruptcy is replaced with a rule of "equity is equality," and individualized collection efforts are replaced with Chapter 11's collective
system. For the sake of the collective settlement, each claim is
stripped of its prebankruptcy procedural rights, namely, its enforcement rights under nonbankruptcy law,23 5 while retaining its substantive right to payment and its prebankruptcy priority.236 In place of
prebankruptcy enforcement rights, each claim is imbued with special
procedural and participatory rights fundamental to the Chapter 11
process.
232 Chapter 11 modification of state law rights
are designed to defuse the conflict and resulting bargaining impasse arising under nonbankruptcy law and lead to a consensual settlement of the debtor-creditor dispute through bargaining that maximizes the value available to satisfy the claims against the firm.... [Chapter
11] alter[s] ... these entitlements and ... add[s] ... unique reorganization entitlements ...
designed to enhance the bargaining process and produce superior resolution of debtor/creditor disputes.

Johnston, supra note 52, at 257 (footnote omitted).
233 E.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
234 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).

235 This disability may only be temporary, of course, given the possibility that the creditor
may be successful in obtaining relief from stay. Id. § 362(d).
236 Bankruptcy does, however, create priorities for certain types of claims, which will be paid
ahead of general unsecured claims, eg., administrative expense claims, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)
(1994), and priority wage claims. Id. § 507(a)(3).
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In effect, a new "firm" is created in bankruptcy, and claimants as
the new "owners" are given a voice in firm management. The creditors must be consulted, even wooed. Outside of bankruptcy, creditors
are generally relegated to the terms of their contracts.23 7 Inside bankruptcy, however, creditors are given a say in the terms of the plan and
the ongoing business. They are entitled to vote on the plan. They
may propose their own plans to compete with the debtor's for the
requisite creditor approvals. They may be heard on numerous issues
such as proposed non-ordinary course transactions of the debtor,23 8
payment of professional fees, assumption of executory contracts, and
proposed settlement of controversies. They are provided representation at the estate's expense, in the form of the creditors' committee.
They may threaten, and in some cases effect, management's ouster.
Each claimant's rights in the community-and indeed the community itself-diverge sharply from the prebankruptcy situation.
These participatory fights are unique to the Chapter 11 proceeding.
Bankruptcy law creates and defines these rights, which form an integral part of the collective process.
Moreover, the Chapter 11 modifications of creditors' prebankruptcy entitlements effectively create the "commodities" worth trading and the market therefor. 239 Without Chapter 11, investing in
distress debt would be far less attractive. Ironically, the problems
meant to be addressed by the creation of the federal bankruptcy system are also the ones that, absent Chapter 11, would impede the buying and selling of creditors' rights against the debtor in distress.
Outside of Chapter 11, a purchaser of debt would generally have
to expend far more time and money-and incur greater risk-pursuing the debtor in order to obtain satisfaction of its debt obligation.
The purchaser of unsecured debt would have to win a judgment or
judgments against the debtor and then attempt to enforce those judgments, perhaps in several different state fora. This process could eas237 E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). Several courts

have held that once a firm becomes insolvent or approaches insolvency, the fiduciary duties of its
management shift from shareholders to creditors. E.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621
A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications
Corp., Civ. No. 12,150, 1991 Del Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6,1991). However, creditors are

given far more protection and a far greater oversight role in the debtor's operations in Chapter
11 than under nonbankruptcy fiduciary duty rules.

238 While certain creditors might exercise similar oversight over the debtor's business activities outside of bankruptcy by virtue of contractual covenants related to credit extensions, such
rights in bankruptcy accrue to all creditors and other parties in interest, without regard to their
particular nonbankruptcy bargains with the debtor. Moreover, these participatory rights are part
of the package of the collective proceeding in Chapter 11, and do not depend on the existence or
nonexistence of such rights outside of bankruptcy.
239 "By the filing of a bankruptcy case, a market in nonpublicly traded securities is created."
In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (Cosetti, J.).
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ily take several years, and all the while, the debt purchaser would have
to worry about other competing creditors' progress in the race to execute on the debtor's scarce assets, or the debtor's preferential payments to competing creditors. The debt purchaser could very well
invest several years' worth of time and legal fees in its collection efforts, only to find at the end of the day that the debtor's assets had
already been exhausted satisfying competing creditors. This possibility, along with the difficulty of obtaining current information concerning the status of competing creditors' legal actions and collection
efforts, makes distress debt investing outside of Chapter 11 relatively
unattractive.
By contrast, Chapter 11 solves several problems for the distress
debt investor. The automatic stay gives some assurance against the
debtor's dismemberment by competing creditors.240 Disclosure rules
require the debtor to provide information not readily available
outside of bankruptcy, 241 thereby enabling creditors both to monitor
the debtor's performance in Chapter 11, and to police the debtor's
eve-of-bankruptcy payments. 242
More specifically, bankruptcy disclosure rules provide information critical to the bankruptcy investor, which it would have no way of
obtaining absent bankruptcy. The simple device of the debtor's schedules facilitates claim acquisition, and for trade claims becomes the basis for the market itself.243 Schedules are meant to enhance the ability
of the court and creditors to monitor the case. However, by identifying specific claimants and the face value of their claims, the schedules
enable the bankruptcy investor to target particular strategic claims for
purchase, and to negotiate individual terms with each targeted claimant. Absent such a convenient ledger-compiled by the debtor, no
less-the prospective investor would at the very least incur higher investigation costs with respect to purchased claims.
At least as significant as the informational advantages, the structure of collective plan negotiation, grounded in the absolute priority
rule and class voting, allows the outside bankruptcy investor to
240 In addition, any motion for relief from stay generally requires notice. FED. R. BANKR. P.
4001(a).

241 11 U.S.C. § 521, (Official Bankruptcy Form 6 (Schedules) and Form 7 (Statement of Financial Affairs)) (as amended prior to Nov. 1, 1994).
242 [T]he Bankruptcy Code and rules require the debtor to file various forms of disclosure
and provide dramatically liberalized access to the debtor's officers, employees, and files....
[T]he existence of a collectivized insolvency proceeding acts as an information forcing device which enables the parties to detect misbehavior that otherwise might have gone unnoticed .... The process also gives every constituency an opportunity to watch the firm during
its transition period, and thus to reassess their [sic] relationship with the debtor.
David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis.
L. REv. 465, 507 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
243 Fortgang & Mayer, 1993 Developments, supranote 13, at 760 ("As is true in virtually every
large case, Federated's schedules became the basis for a market in trade claims.").
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purchase a position of great negotiating leverage. By purchasing
claims strategically, the bankruptcy investor becomes an important
constituent in the collective, which enhances the investor's ability to
negotiate for a profit. It may acquire a blocking position in a class of
claims, thereby obtaining holdout power to block confirmation of any
plan not to its liking.
This prospect of leverage is critical to the claim's investment
value.
In Chapter 7, by contrast, "[c]laims trading is virtually unheard
of," 244 even though claims are as available for purchase in Chapter 7
as in Chapter 11. The bare right to payment inherent in a claim
against a Chapter 7 debtor is simply not an attractive investment. It
represents merely a pro rata right to payment against the debtor's assets in liquidation. Because the distribution of value in Chapter 7 is
not subject to collective negotiation, holdout opportunities are not
available for purchase. Such leverage is available for purchase only in
Chapter 11. Without Chapter 11, the rights to payment are not worth
buying.
In addition, the overall scaling down of debt in Chapter 11 improves the reorganized debtor's ability to make good on payment of
its postconfirmation obligations. 24 5 Without such scaling down of
debt, the enterprise would be less viable. It would have limited free
assets, and therefore fewer resources with which to satisfy demands of
holdouts. Each creditor benefits from the discharge of other creditors' claims against the debtor, and a bigger pie allows the bankruptcy
investor a greater opportunity for profit.
That Chapter 11 creates "commodities" worth trading and that a
market for claims may develop in a given case are simply unintended
consequences of Chapter 11. Claims trading is not necessary to the
purposes and policies underlying Chapter 11, and in given cases may
be undesirable.
Because the claimholder's bankruptcy rights differ significantly
from the creditor's bundle of rights outside of bankruptcy-and the
collective bankruptcy regime likewise differs from debt collection
outside of bankruptcy-a claim transfer in Chapter 11 is a transaction
with implications very different from an assignment of creditor rights
outside of bankruptcy. Free alienability of creditor rights outside of
bankruptcy therefore does not necessarily suggest that free transferability of bankruptcy claims should be the rule.24 6 The bromide of respecting nonbankruptcy rights in bankruptcy does not apply neatly to
244 Minkel & Baker, supra note 13, at 44 n.32.

245 The Code also empowers the debtor to reject unprofitable executory contracts. 11 U.S.C.
§ 365 (1994).
246 Cf. Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 801 F.2d
60, 67 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing that even with solvent debtor, if Equity Committee's state
court action to compel shareholders' meeting to replace directors caused "real jeopardy to reor-
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this question, since the critical component of the commodity being
traded is invented in Chapter 11.247 To the extent free transferability
may be deemed a right unto itself outside of bankruptcy, the effects of
its exercise in Chapter 11 should inform the extent of its survival
therein. 248 When general notions of free markets and alienability of
property conflict with and imperil the rehabilitative goals of Chapter
11, rehabilitative goals should prevail.
B.

Claims and Markets

The notion of the "market for claims" deserves special scrutiny.
The free alienability account of claims trading tends to adopt the language and imagery of public securities markets,24 9 implying a free
market model of trading250 and impugning judicially imposed restrictions on trading as simply meddling in the market.251 As part of this
market rhetoric, the free alienability account tends to conceptualize
the Chapter 11 claim as a discrete, self-contained object, a "black box"
ganization prospects," shareholders' right to compel such a meeting could be overridden in
Chapter 11).
247 Cf.CrS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), in which the court considered, inter alia, a Commerce Clause challenge to an Indiana antitakeover statute that effectively
conditioned acquisition of a qualifying Indiana corporation on majority approval of disinterested
shareholders. Upholding the constitutionality of the state statute, the Court noted that "[t]he
very commodity that is traded in the securities market is one whose characteristics are defined
by state law," and that the state statute merely defined the attributes of shares in such Indiana
corporations. Id.at 94.
248 See, eg., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE Loic AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTcy LAW (1986).
Respecting [nonbankruptcy] rights in full... can conflict with the core role of bankruptcy to
maximize the value of assets in the face of pressures to ignore the collective weal for
individual gain. Thus, it is necessary to weigh the damage that recognizing a particular
nonbankruptcy right would cause to collective action against the costs of any incentives that
would be potentially created by upsetting that right. Because the collective damage resulting from adhering to a right may sometimes exceed any benefit, a bankruptcy statute sometimes must replace nonbankruptcy rights with something else.
Id.at 28 (emphasis in original).
249 See supra note 112.
250 In the paradigmatic free market,
the participants trade a standardized contract such that each unit of the contract is a perfect
substitute for any other unit. The identities of the parties in any mutually agreeable transaction do not affect the terms of exchange. The organized market itself or some other institution deliberately creates a homogeneous good that can be traded anonymously by the
participants or their agents.
Lester G. Telser & Harlow N. Higinbotham, OrganizedFuturesMarkets: Costs and Benefits, 85 J.
Pot. EcoN. 969, 997 (1977). The public securities markets are perceived to approximate the
paradigmatic free market. See, eg., Van Zandt, supra note 12.
Of all the real world markets, the markets for secondary trading of financial assets seem
most accurately to reflect th[e] ideal description [of the market]. On first glance and in the
popular imagination, these markets in which large sums change hands at breakneck speed
are the epitome of the free market: they consist of helter-skelter trading driven only by the
avariciousness of the individual participants.
Id.at 968.
251 See supra subpart .C.
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or "widget,"252 the transfer of which concerns none but the purchasers3
and seller. The relational aspects of claimants' rights in Chapter 112
are ignored. Only by relying on this characterization can the assertion
be made that assignment of a Chapter 11 claim "simply substitutes
one creditor for another," and that
the assignee merely "stands in the
shoes of the original claimant." 25 4
However, claims are not widgets, and the claims market functions
nothing like the public securities markets.
Notwithstanding the Code's arid definition of a claim as a "right
to payment," 255 a claim is hardly a discrete right or set of rights. It
encompasses far more than simply an opportunity to howl at the
debtor's doorstep for payment. A claim allows entr6e to an entire
process by which the debtor is remade. The bankruptcy investor buys
not simply a static and discrete right to demand payment, 25 6 but a pan-

oply of rights that allows it to haggle with the other interested parties
in the reorganization over a broad range of operational
and financial
issues, including consideration for its claims.257
Once the relational aspects of the claim are acknowledged, it becomes apparent that claim assignments are more than private transac252 Cf.Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426
(1976) (arguing that economists have overstated their case against economic regulation by suppressing relational aspects of contract in favor of a "paradigmatic contract" involving "a discrete
transaction conveying a well-defined object (the ever popular widget) in exchange for cash," and
proposing that theorists instead "open up the 'black box' of contract").
253 See supra subparts II.A-B.
254 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
255 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994).
256 Cf.Goldberg, supranote 252, at 427-28 (citation omitted):
The pure discrete transaction of economic theory involves the contemporaneous exchange
of claims or rights between the contracting parties. The identity of the parties and the social
milieu within which the contract is consummated are irrelevant. The exchange is cloaked in
anonymity with one party selling to the market and the other buying from the market.
257 Nor is a claim the ideal standardized contract to trade in the free market. Claims are
neither homogeneous nor fungible. Claims of equal face value but in different classes are not
interchangeable. With the exception of claims based on public debt securities, even claims in the
same class are not necessarily interchangeable. For example, the debtor may have defenses to
one trade claim but not another. See supra note 78.
Moreover, the value to the bankruptcy investor of the last claim needed to amass a blocking
position is worth proportionally more than the first claim purchased. See, e.g., In re Allegheny
Int'l Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 290 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that bankruptcy investor paid proportionally more for last bank claim necessary to create blocking position in that class than it did
for prior and subsequent purchases).
The same observation could be made with respect to the last share of stock necessary to
take control of a company. However, this does not suggest that the claims market resembles the
public securities markets, but may suggest an analogy to the market for corporate control. See
infra note 264.
Nor is the market impersonal. The identities of the purchaser and seller matter. See supra
Part II.
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tions between willing buyers and sellers. 258 Trading may impose
externalities on the community. The parties make reorganization-specific investments in the process, including investment in their relationships with each other. While the selling claimant should be free to
forego the value of its own investment, a claim transfer unfortunately
destroys the reorganization-specific investments of others as well. The
course of negotiation, the substance of the collective settlement, the
costs of the process, and the general functioning of the Chapter 11
community are all affected by the composition and stability of the
creditor constituency.
Externalities from claims trading suggest that some restraints on
alienation may be preferable to a "free market" approach. As Professor Epstein explained, "Rules restraining alienation are best accounted for, both positively and normatively, by the need to control
problems of external harm and the common pool. '259 The externali258 See Goldberg, supra note 252, at 426-27 ("[The] discrete transactional mold is apt to be
singularly inappropriate for representing relations which are to take place over a long period of
time and in which the parties will have to deal with each other regularly over a wide range of
issues (many of them unknown in advance).").
259 Richard A. Epstein, Why RestrainAlienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970, 990 (1985). Professor Epstein presents two examples of common-law restraints on alienation intended to control imposition of external costs in a common pool situation. The common pool in Chapter 11 is
similarly susceptible to externalities from claims trading.
Professor Epstein's first example involves restraint on the rights of riparian landowners to
sell water rights. While the private sale presumably allocates water to a party who values it more
highly, and "the two parties to that sale will both be gainers," the buyer's use "may also be a
more intensive use, which means that any sale of riparian rights may diminish the correlative
rights of other claimants to the common pool." Ld.
at 981. Partial restrictions on alienation
serve to preserve the common pool while allowing transactions which move resources to highervalued uses.
The second example involves the Roman law of usufruct. The holder of the usufruct interest-roughly analogous to a life estate---could not alienate its interest to a third party, but could
release her interest back to the owner of the property. Likewise, under English law, an easement in gross was inalienable, and any attempt to do so created a mere license between the
parties. These restrictions were intended to protect property owners from abuse of their land by
users not of their choosing. Id.at 983-84; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the
Theory of PropertyRights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931,938 (1985) ("Externalities figure prominently
in discussions of market failure and provide the most commonly recognized rationale for inalienability rules.").
Alienability of other bankruptcy-created rights is restricted. For example, "[t]he right to
object to a debtor's discharge is not a marketable commodity which may be purchased by one
party from another in order to inflict further punishment and discomfort on the debtor." In re
Beugen, 99 B.R. 961, 965 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). In that case, as part of a
personal vendetta against the debtor, the claim purchaser bought his claim solely to obtain
standing to object to the individual debtor's discharge. Id.
The debtor's right to redeem personal property in Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1994), is not
assignable. In re Davis, 20 B.R. 212,214 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1982) (citing S. REp. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5881); In re Fitzgerald, 20 B.R. 27,29
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982). Congress was aware of the potential for abuse of the debtor's redemption right:
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ties can be ignored only by suppressing the complexity of the bundle
of rights subsumed within the Chapter 11 claim. Only in this way is
260
the free market model of trading sustained.
Moreover, a close look at the "market for claims" reveals critical
distinctions between its functioning and that of the public securities
markets. Claims are not really sold; claims are purchased. In other
words, bankruptcy investors are the market. There are few passive or
casual retail investors purchasing in the market, 2 61 as barriers to entry
are high. The costs of investigation and participation in the reorganization process eliminate all but the professional bankruptcy investor,
who alone has sufficient capital and sophistication to play. The "market," then, consists almost exclusively of bankruptcy investors
purchasing claims from the debtor's prebankruptcy creditors or from
other bankruptcy investors.
To prevent abuses such as may occur when the debtor deliberately allows the property to
depreciate in value, the debtor will be required to pay the fair market value of the goods or
the amount of the claim if the claim is less. The right is personal to the debtor and not
assignable.
S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5881. Assignability would do harm to consumer creditors. Undersecured consumer creditors would more
frequently suffer strip down of their liens as a market developed in redemption rights and the
personal property available for Chapter 7 redemption. Consumer creditors' leverage to negotiate reaffirmation agreements would also presumably suffer.
A family support obligation loses its priority status and nondischargeable character if assigned. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7)(A), 523(a)(5)(A) (1994). These examples illustrate the personal
character of certain bankruptcy entitlements meant to effect specific bankruptcy policies. Such
rights are meant to be exercised only by the initial holders of such rights in bankruptcy. Even
though assignment of such special rights might benefit both assignors and assignees, other affected parties might suffer adverse consequences from such assignments.
While these analogies are not perfect, they illustrate the general idea that certain rights
subsumed within the claimholder's bundle should not trade as marketable commodities. Because trading in these entitlements would visit costs on third parties-and possibly assignorsthe initial holders of such rights are not permitted to assign.
260 There is a certain irony to a market-based defense of unrestricted trading, given that bankruptcy is fundamentally antithetical to markets. Bankruptcy upsets outcomes which would
otherwise be determined by competition among creditors and the debtor under decentralized
state law collection regimes. Bankruptcy trumps private contractual arrangements. Bankruptcy
replaces competition with collectivization and also attempts to promote cooperation. See supra
subpart II.B.
261 The market for distressed securities is completely private. Says Don Gevirtz [of The
Foothill Group], "We maintain regular contacts with banks' workout departments and let
them know we want to buy loans or securities when they want to get rid of them." This kind
of market information is strictly confidential ....
We're talking about a $284 billion market. ... The market is too complicated, there are too many parties [involved], for it to ever
be a retail market."
Campbell, supra note 223, at 41.
There may be small-scale postpetition trading in the debtor's public debt securities by passive investors. However, even the market for public debt securities is illiquid compared to equity
markets. "[Tlhere is simply not a liquid auction market, or even continuous trading, in debt
securities, at least not of the kind that is available for equity securities of the same issuers." John
C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion The Problem of Constrained Choice in
Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations,58 U. Ci. L. REv. 1207, 1218 (1991).
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Unlike the vast majority of investors in the public securities markets, the bankruptcy investor takes an active role in determining the
fate of its investment. It does not purchase claims on the bland hope
that the reorganization plan will bless its investment with a profitable
return. It buys a strong negotiating position in the reorganization and
attempts to maximize its return through active participation in the
process. The object of trading in this market is therefore not simply
the abstract right to payment represented by any individual claim.
That bare right to payment is not an attractive investment.262 The
bankruptcy investor buys claims for their process rights-the prospect
of leverage in plan negotiation. 263 In other words, there is really no
264
market for claims qua claims; the market is a market for leverage.
The asset being acquired is influence over the plan process. Viewed in
this light, the potential for imposition of externalities becomes
evident.
This market for leverage is also highly illiquid, unlike public securities markets. While bankruptcy investors provide liquidity to the
market in the process of assembling strategic blocks of claims, there is
nothing approaching continuous trading. Purchasing is sporadic and
idiosyncratic, and there is no centralized system for disseminating
price information. 265 Compared to the securities markets, the claims
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 218-34 and accompanying text.
264 Rather than the public securities markets, the market for corporate control provides perhaps a closer analogy to the claims market. Participants in the market for corporate control
purchase shares in the public equity markets, but the shares are not prized merely as passive
investments. Participants acquire shares in order to aggregate controlling blocks of stock. Control is an asset distinct from other aspects of the issuer enterprise and is the actual asset being
bought and sold in this market. Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. PoL. ECON. 110 (1965). Whether corporate control transactions are good or bad, and
whether restrictions on these transactions are appropriate, may be the subject of some debate,
but the terms of debate certainly recognize externalities as an issue. See, eg., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Regulating the Market for CorporateControl,A CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
CorporateGovernance, 84 COLUM. L. Rv. 1145, 1248-49 (1984) (recognizing that employees,
suppliers, pensioners, and lower level managers have economic stake in a corporation and may
be adversely affected by increased leverage or other substantial shift in direction of risk preference); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations,Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. Rv. 1931, 1972
(1991) (explaining Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
lime Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) as a reflection of "a widely-shared social sense that selfinterested, market-oriented behavior had gotten out of hand in the takeover area," and of the
notion that social values such as "loyalty, community, and cultural continuity" should be protected even in corporate context); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism,136 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1987). Gordon relies on Karl Polanyi's broader thesis that
markets require regulation in order to prevent social dislocation. KARL PoLAmN , Tim GREAT
TRA sFomuAroN (1944).
265 Cf. Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of
Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CoRmELL L. REV. 1007, 1018
(1990) ("Exchanges enhance secondary market liquidity because they serve as central producers
and disseminators of information.").
262
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market is illiquid, discontinuous, and inefficient.266 Transaction costs
are high.
In this type of market, efficiency losses from restrictions on trading are likely to be negligible. The costs of participating are so high to
begin with that any incremental increase from trading restrictions
would not likely have the significant "chilling effect" bemoaned by
commentators. 267 Applying a public securities market model to claims
trading merely allows overstatement of the case against trading
2 68
restrictions.
Characterizing claims trading as a private transaction in the free
and liquid market for claims tends to mask the collective nature of
Chapter 11 and the complexity of the bundles of rights created
thereby. Claims are not discrete commodities that should or do trade
freely in impersonal markets. A free market model ignores much that
is significant about claims and their trading.
C.

Precedentunder the Bankruptcy Code

Considering the historical development of Chapter 11, it is not
surprising that the Code contains no explicit provision anticipating the
adverse effects of claims trading on the Chapter 11 reorganization
process. The respective structures of Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act help to explain why claims were presumed to be freely
transferable under those reorganization regimes. 269 Moreover, no legislative history exists that would suggest that the drafters of the Code
even considered such issues.
In spite of the absence of a specific statutory provision, courts
have responded to deleterious effects of claims trading in the large
cases with equitable or other discretionary remedies. While courts
have generally not emphasized process concerns and externalities
from claims trading even when granting relief, several decisions suggest some sensitivity to these issues. When trading threatens dissipation of estate assets, courts have relied on their general equitable
266 See id. at 1014 ("Undeveloped, illiquid, thinly traded securities markets tend to be inefficient, while highly developed, liquid, thickly traded markets tend to be efficient."); see also Coffee & Klein, supranote 261, at 1219 ("A recent Wall Street Journal survey found that bonds that
are not exchange-listed may be simultaneously traded at very different prices by different brokerage firms-the result one would expect from a market characterized by irregular trading and
little publicly available information.") (citation omitted).
267 See supra notes 111, 163.
268 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market MicrostructureJustification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation,26 CONN.L. Rnv. 1, 43
(1993) (arguing that a change in transaction costs will affect the price of a good more significantly if overall transaction costs are low than if they are high and that with illiquid markets,
transaction costs from illiquidity are so high that "[a]n effort to reduce transaction costs appears
pointless").
269 See supra section I.C.1.
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powers under Section 105(a)270 to address such problems. In addition,
271
courts' construction of the "good faith" concept in Section 1126(e)
manifests some recognition of the cost implications of trading. The
remainder of this subpart argues that even absent a specific statute
addressed to claims trading, courts' equitable powers are broad
enough to respond to its adverse effects. Moreover, courts' actions
described below may be generalized to address the problems of externalities previously discussed.
1. Section 105(a).-Section 105(a) empowers the court to "issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title. ' 272 This grant of power is similar
to that found in the All Writs Statute, 273 which "enables courts to address situations for which no specific process has been provided by
statute."274 While this equitable power is broad, 275 it is not limitless.
Its exercise must be consistent with the provisions of the Code. It
"does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights
that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a
roving commission to do equity." 276
Courts have explicitly relied on Section 105(a) in several claims
trading cases to fashion particular relief, responding to the threat 27of7
imposition of externalities on the estate. In In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Judge Lifland discussed as one of the "'evils' spawned by bankruptcy
claims trading in 'mega' cases,.., the substantially increased burden
associated with monitoring, administering and objecting to claims
which have been filed against the estate. This increased administra270 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).

271 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1994) ("On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not
in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions
of this title.").
272 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
273 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 316-17.
274 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcY, supra note 47,

105.01[1], at 105-3.

275 See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 801 F.2d
60 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that enjoining state court proceeding initiated by Equity Committee to
compel shareholder's meeting for purpose of replacing debtor's directors was within court's equitable powers).
[I]f the bankruptcy court may ever use its equitable powers under section 105(a) to enjoin
actions pursued in other courts as "concerning the administration of the estate" under section 157(b)(2)(A), it may exercise that power where there is a basis for concluding that
rehabilitation, the very purpose for the bankruptcy proceedings, might be undone by the
other action.
Id. at 64.
276 United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (finding no
authority under § 105(a) for court's award of monthly support payments to debtor's spouse from
debtor's Chapter 11 estate). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANutwurcy, supra note 47,

105.01

(analyzing bankruptcy court's power under § 105).
277 119 B.R. 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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tive burden diverts the limited resources of the Debtor's estate and
has the potential for impeding the reorganization process." 278 As to
the authority of bankruptcy courts to respond to this problem, the
court found that "[b]ankruptcy courts are afforded the power to limit
or prevent bankruptcy claims trading where taking such action is in
furtherance of the court's exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of the debtor's estate and will relieve the debtor and its estate
from a great administrative burden." While that court relied in part
on a prior version of Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2), which has since
been amended to narrow the court's role in administrative aspects of
claim transfers, 279
§ 105 of the Code also authorizes this Court to fashion appropriate remedies to protect against threatened harm to, or interference with the
sound administration of the estate. Indeed, both this Court and other
bankruptcy courts have in the past acted to restrict assignments
of claims
28 0
where such action was in the best interests of the estate

The most dramatic instance of a court's grant of equitable relief
from adverse consequences of claims trading came in the Pan Am
bankruptcy, in which the debtors successfully petitioned the court for
an injunction prohibiting all transfers of general unsecured claims and
significant transfers of publicly traded bonds and debentures. Unchecked trading in claims, if allowed to continue, might have precluded the reorganized debtor from making full use of favorable tax
attributes following confirmation. Like many Chapter 11 debtors, Pan
Am had incurred severe losses prior to bankruptcy. Generally these
losses may be carried forward by the reorganized debtor and deducted
against future income earned, thereby reducing future income tax liability. In Pan Am's case, the debtor's disclosure statement valued
these net operating loss "carryforwards" (NOLs) as high as $500 mil278 Id. at 444. For a discussion questioning the substance of Judge Lifland's concerns, see
Fortgang & Mayer, 1993 Developments, supra note 13, at 756 n.18 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
280 Ionosphere Clubs, 119 B.R. at 445 (citations omitted).
Some have asserted that the 1991 amendment to Rule 3001(e) precludes all parties except
the transferor from objecting to a claim transfer. E.g., Fortgang & Mayer, 1991 Developments,
supra note 13, at 4 ("[T]he amended Rule 3001(e) will stop third parties-most notably the
debtor, but occasionally other creditors-from attempting to hold up court approval of a claims
transfer to further their own private agendas."). Moreover, the Advisory Committee note states
the intention of the amendment "to limit the court's role to the adjudication of disputes regarding transfers of claims." FED R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) advisory committee's note.
While the amendment may narrow availability of standing to challenge claim transfers
under Rule 3001(e), it could hardly be read to restrict other provisions in the Code or Rules. In
particular, equitable relief from trading may be appropriate in a given case, independent of Rule
3001. In that case, the contents of Rule 3001(e) would be irrelevant. Moreover, no Bankruptcy
Rule or its amendment may "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (1994).
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lion.281 This value could have been jeopardized by continued trading
282
in Pan Am's publicly traded bonds and other unsecured claims.
Relying on the concept embodied in In re Prudential Lines,
Inc.28 3 that the debtor's NOLs constitute property of the estate within
the meaning of Section 541,284 the court found that further trading
that might jeopardize the reorganized debtors' use of such NOLs
would violate the automatic stay's prohibition against "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate
or to exercise control over property of the estate." 28 5 The court issued
under Section 105(a) in furtherance of the automatic
an injunction
28 6
stay.

Along the same lines, courts should recognize other explicit and
implicit costs that ill-timed trading could impose on the estate. These
costs are borne by the estate no less than the NOLs preserved in Pan

281 First Amended Disclosure Statement with respect to the Revised Joint Consolidated Plan
of Reorganization Proposed by the Debtors and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
for Pan Am Corporation and Its Affiliated Debtors, dated as of October 24, 1991, In re Pan Am
Corp., Chapter 11 Case Nos. 91 B 10080 (CB) through 91 B 10087 (CB) (inclusive), at 93.
282 Section 382(a) of the Internal Revenue Code limits a corporation's use of its NOLs once
there has been an ownership change-a greater than fifty percentage point change in the corporation's stock ownership over a three-year period. This limitation would normally be triggered
in a large Chapter 11 reorganization, since the plan will typically distribute significant stock in
the reorganized debtor to creditors who were not prepetition stockholders. Therefore, the statute also contains a special bankruptcy exception: the § 382(a) limitations will not apply if shareholders and creditors of the debtor corporation immediately before the ownership change in
Chapter 11 end up holding at least fifty percent of the value of the reorganized debtor's stock
following confirmation, provided that of the stock issued to creditors, only qualified "old and
cold" creditors count. I.R.C. § 382(1)(5) (1994). A qualified "old and cold" creditor is one that
has either held its claim for at least 18 months prior to the filing of the petition, or acquired its
claim as a trade creditor and has continuously held the beneficial interest in such claim. Treas.
Reg. § 1.382-9(d)(2)(i) (1992). For a complete discussion of this complex area, see 7 MERTENS
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §

29.110 (1994).

Because of this "old and cold" creditor requirement, claims trading may make it impossible
for the debtor to qualify for this exception. The bankruptcy investor will rarely qualify as an
"old and cold" creditor. Trading may therefore endanger the value of the NOLs to the reorganized debtor. See generally Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims,supra note 13, at 111-13; Minkel
& Baker, supra note 13, at 46-51 (questioning rationale of NOL preservation in several cases in
which trading injunctions issued).
283 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. PSS Steamship Co. v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors, 502 U.S. 821 (1991).
284 Property of the estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
285 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1994).
286 Pan Am Corp. v. All Unsecured Creditors et al. (In re Pan Am Corp.), Adv. No. 91-6175A
(CB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1991).
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Am and other cases. 28 7 Equitable relief under Section 105(a) is
2 88
equally justified.
Some commentators have argued that such equitable relief
should be withheld absent a more specific statutory basis. 28 9 However, in his famous Avon Park decision,290 Justice Douglas described
courts' broad equitable powers to protect "investors against an inside
few, or ... one class of investors from the encroachments of another"
in the claims trading context:
[T]he court has ample power to adjust the remedy to meet the need.
The requirement of full, unequivocal disclosure; the limitation of the
vote to the amount paid for the securities; the separate classification of
claimants; the complete subordination of some claims, indicate the range
and type of the power which a court of bankruptcy may exercise in these
proceedings. That power is ample for the exigencies of varying situations. It is not dependent on express statutory
provisions. It inheres in
29
the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy. '

Other courts have recognized Section 105(a) as authorizing equitable relief in the claims trading context. In FSLIC v. Mmahat,292 the
debtor moved under Section 105(a) to have a purchased claim reduced for "unfairness, unconscionability and the potential for
abuse. ' 293 Remanding to the bankruptcy court for reconsideration of
its denial of the debtor's motion in light of certain changed circumstances, the court noted: "The Bankruptcy Court, as a court of equity,
287 See Fortgang & Mayer, 1993 Developments, supra note 13, at 757-58, for a discussion of
Pan Am and other cases in which litigation occurred concerning the effect of claims trading on
the estate's NOLs.
288 While the analysis is useful, the Pan Am decision may not be authoritative, as it was never
published. Apparently, the issue was not fully litigated because no substantive objection was
made. Id. at n.125.
289 "If Congress wants to preserve NOLs from accidental destruction by claims trading, Congress has the power to do so. We question, however, whether a bankruptcy court should assume
such power in the absence of specific statutory authority." Fortgang & Mayer, 1993 Developments, supra note 13, at 759.
290 American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940) (Douglas, J.).
291 Id. at 146 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In that case, the fiscal agent retained by
the debtor municipality purchased claims for its own account and voted them in favor of the
debtor's Chapter IX composition, but failed to disclose this interest to other creditors from
whom it solicited votes for the plan. The Court held that the fiscal agent's failure to disclose this
interest required reversal of a lower court order confirming the plan. Id. See also Fortgang &
Mayer, Trading Claims, supranote 13. "The applicable law is not in the Code and it is not in the
Rules, but it does reside in the general equitable powers of the bankruptcy court. The Supreme
Court has held that no specific statute is needed to punish fiduciary trading." Id. at 33 (emphasis
in original) (approving Avon Park description of court's broad equitable powers in context of
fiduciary trading).
292 89 B.R. 573 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1988).
293 Id. at 574.
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may look to the substance of a transaction and, if appropriate, devise
new remedies where those at law are inadequate. '294
2. Allegheny. Good Faith under Section 1126(e).-In various
contexts, courts have relied on Section 1126(e) to disqualify claim purchasers' votes against a plan on the ground that the claims were not
procured or voted in "good faith. '295 In the contested confirmation of
Allegheny, the court disqualified votes against the debtor's plan because the claims voted had been acquired just prior to the plan balloting for the specific purpose of blocking confirmation. 296 The finding
of bad faith in that case recognized that claims trading may impose
unacceptable costs on the estate and frustrate the reorganization process. The holding can be generalized to justify equitable relief from
trading in other contexts.
In Allegheny, the court was willing to: (1) disqualify votes of
claims acquired at the eleventh hour by a bankruptcy investor, Japonica Partners, for the purpose of blocking confirmation of the debtor's
plan; and (2) require that all stock in the reorganized debtor to be
received by Japonica Partners under the debtor's confirmed plan be
placed in trust for three years, depriving Japonica of voting rights for
three years. 297 By the time of the confirmation hearing, the case had
been running for over two years, during which time ten of the debtor's
proposed plans had failed. 298 Japonica Partners was not a prepetition
creditor or equityholder of the debtor.299 It had for some months
prior to the confirmation hearing been interested in acquiring control
of the debtor, but did not purchase claims against the debtor until
close to the conclusion of hearings on the debtor's disclosure statement.3 00 For $2712, it purchased $10,000 in face amount of the
debtor's public subordinated debentures.3 01 This purchase enabled it
294 Id.
at 575; see also In re Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 87 B.R.
17, 19 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988) (affirming court's equitable power under § 105 to deny unconditional transfer where court deems transfer inappropriate).
295 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
296 In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
297 As part of the debtor's plan, the certificate of incorporation of the reorganized debtor
contained a control provision, which basically stated that if any person acquired 30% voting
control in the reorganized debtor within two years after the effective date of the plan, all other
holders of common stock were entitled to put their shares to such person at a price equal to the
highest per share price paid by such person for its shares. Responding to Japonica's express
intent not to comply with this control provision, and relying on its equitable powers under
§ 105(a), the court ordered Japonica's shares held in trust for three years unless Japonica established its willingness and ability to comply with the control provision. Id. at 300-04.
298 See Minkel & Baker, supra note 13, at 75.
299 Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 286.
300 Id.
301 Id.
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to qualify as a party in interest in order to file a competing plan,3°2
which Japonica did just prior to approval of the debtor's disclosure
statement.30 3 Under Japonica's plan, it would have acquired control
of the debtor. Following approval of the debtor's disclosure statement, during the vote solicitation period preceding the confirmation
hearing on the debtor's plan, 30 4 Japonica commenced a program of
strategic claim purchasing, acquiring blocking positions in the two senior impaired creditor classes, "ensuring
that the debtor could not
confirm its plan of reorganization. '30 5
Japonica's blocking strategy may have worked too well. The
court found that Japonica's position enabled it to "defeat any... plan
and thereby obstruct a 'fair and feasible reorganization.' "306 Relying
on Section 1126(e), the court found that Japonica's claim purchases
were made in bad faith. The court designated-that is, disqualifiedJaponica's votes against the debtor's plan, enabling confirmation of
the debtor's plan.3 0 7 In so doing, the court expressed concern over the
effect of Japonica's claims acquisition strategy on the confirmation
process generally:
If... an outsider to the process can purchase a blocking position, those
creditors and interest holders are disenfranchised.... [T]he votes of the
other creditors and interest holders are rendered meaningless. Moreover, Japonica, who chose to become a 308
creditor, should not have veto
control over the reorganization process.
In contrast, the court denied Japonica's motion to designate votes of
certain banks, noting that "[u]nlike Japonica, the banks have been
parties to this case since that fateful Saturday afternoon in February
1988" 309-the date the debtor's petition was filed. In other words, the
banks invested in the process from the first day. Japonica's last-minute attempt to hold up and retrade this deal would have nullified the
banks' investment, as well as 310
the investment by the debtor and other
creditors in the plan process.
302 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1994).
303 After approval of the debtor's disclosure statement, the filing of a competing plan would
generally have been time barred. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016(a).
304 Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 286.

305 Id. at 290. Japonica had requested that the court delay the confirmation hearing on the
debtor's plan in order to allow approval of Japonica's disclosure statement and joint balloting for
the competing plans. The court refused this request. Id. at 286.
306 Id. at 289 (citations omitted).
307 Id. at 290.
308 Id.

Id. at 293.
310 This interpretation of "good faith" comports with the legislative history of § 1126(e) and
its predecessor provision in the Bankruptcy Act. "[S]ection 1126(e) ... is intended to forestall
the 'nuisance blocker'-that is, the investor who waits for a plan of reorganization to be fully
negotiated and only then invests in a 'hold-up' to extract more (even if on a class-wide basis) by
the threat of delay." Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims, supra note 13, at 97 (citation omitted).
309
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While the Allegheny decision involved several other complex confirmation issues in addition to the bad faith designation of votes-and
generated controversy as to each 311 -the confirmation fight highlights
the costs that might have been imposed on the estate from Japonica's
last-minute attempt to hold up and retrade a deal already agreed upon
by the parties. The general lesson of Allegheny may be:
[T]he only acquiror who can buy claims cheaply is one who does so well
in advance of any plan of reorganization-one who takes the risks of the
plan process and not merely the rewards. Such sentiments run throughout Judge Cosetti's opinion, which essentially condemns any claims
purchases related to confirming or opposing a plan. Those sentiments,
and that holding.... [fit] rather well with Chapter 11's more
overarching
31 2
purposes of debtor rehabilitation and creditor protection.

Eve-of-confirmation claim purchasing for the purpose of blocking a
plan is simply the extreme case of frustrating the Chapter 11 process
through claims trading. Bankruptcy investors should not be allowed
to nullify other creditors' investment in the process at the eleventh
hour. The court in In re Applegate Property, Ltd.313 was also willing to
address this type of disruption by designating blocking votes
purchased at the eleventh hour:
Sanctioning claims acquisition for purposes of blocking an opponent's
plan would ... ignite a scramble for votes conducted almost entirely
outside the Code's carefully developed structure (plan, disclosure statement, equal treatment, regulated solicitation, court-supervised confirmation), leaving creditors to select not the3best
plan but the best deal they
14
might be able to individually negotiate

Bad faith designation in this context is, however, only a partial
solution. In addition to the costs avoided by the court's designation of
the bankruptcy investor's votes in Allegheny, that decision highlights
other costs as well, which the parties actually incurred, and to which
bad faith designation does not respond: those expended in the confirCf.David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of CorporateVoting in Chapter11 Reorganization
Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 461, 513-18 (1992) (arguing for replacement of § 1126(c) supermajority
creditor voting requirement with simple majority voting in order to diminish threat of holdup by
blocking claim acquiror).
311 For contrasting views on the ultimate holding in the case, compare Fortgang & Mayer,
1991 Developments, supra note 13, at 27 (approving holding that bankruptcy investor was "insider" but offering alternative analysis) with Minkel & Baker, supra note 13, at 71 (disagreeing
with holding and both court's analysis and Fortgang & Mayer alternative analysis).
312 Fortgang & Mayer, 1991 Developments, supra note 13, at 33.
313 133 B.R. 827 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
314 Id.at 836. In the context of competing plans, an affiliate of the debtor purchased unsecured claims at face value, voting them in favor of the debtor's plan and against the creditor's.
These claim purchases were not disclosed in the debtor's disclosure statement. The debtor defended such purchases as necessary to preempt the creditor proponent from purchasing the
claims to assure confirmation of its own plan. Relying on § 1126(e), the court designated the
debtor affiliate's votes against the creditor plan because such votes were neither acquired nor
voted in good faith. Id.
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mation fight and the unsuccessful negotiations preceding the fight,
and the costs of failed
or inhibited cooperation caused by the shadow
315
of claims trading.
Disqualification of votes after solicitation, balloting, and a contested confirmation hearing is inherently retrospective. By the time
the votes are designated and the outcome of the hearing known, the
parties have already incurred the costs of inhibited cooperation
throughout the case. In addition, the bankruptcy investor's entry
forces the parties to reinvest in new relationships and to incur the
costs of ultimately unsuccessful negotiations that precede the contested confirmation. Finally, the parties-including the bankruptcy
investor-are forced to expend scarce resources on a confirmation
fight that is ultimately mooted by the designation of votes. 316 But this
is not an efficient way to preserve the integrity of the confirmation
process. In Allegheny, bad faith designation penalized the bankruptcy
investor for a strategy that would have imposed further costs on the
estate and other creditors by frustrating the plan process. However,
this retrospective remedy does nothing to avoid or recover the costs
actually incurred as a result of claims trading.
Equitable relief, by contrast, could be granted prospectively. A
general cost-based approach to equitable relief, such as the proposal
described below, would be effective if available well before the confirmation hearing. All parties, including the bankruptcy investor, would
avoid the inefficiencies of fighting over issues at confirmation that
could have been eliminated earlier in the case. In light of the rehabilitative goals of Chapter 11 and the possible pernicious effects of claims
trading, parties in interest should be able to object to having to bear
such costs.
IV.

A

MODEST PROPOSAL: EQUITABLE RELIEF FROM ADVERSE

EFFECrS OF CLAIMS TRADING

To this point, the tone of the discussion on claims trading may
sound decidedly negative. However, this Article's purpose is merely
to call attention to certain potential adverse effects on the confirmation process and the concomitant costs that may be visited on third
315 See supra section II.B.3.
316 This problem could possibly be avoided by having parties bring their § 1126(e) motions
early on in the confirmation process, or as early as the time trades are proposed. Perhaps preemptive use of § 1126(e) would spare the estate from having to cover costs of professional feesboth its own and those of the creditors' committee-for a contested confirmation. Application
of this practice to publicly traded debt claims, however, may be problematic, since no court filing
is required with respect to such trades. See supranote 91. It might therefore be difficult for any
movant to bring its § 1126(e) motion until after such a trade has already occurred. On the other
hand, it is not uncommon for a major claims acquiror to petition the court for clarification of its
voting and distribution rights prior to consummating proposed transfers, even those based on
public debt. See infra note 329.
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parties-Chapter 11 debtors and creditors. Because of the potential
benefits that may derive from claims trading, 17 a blanket prohibition
is unwarranted. Moreover, given the complex and subtle predicaments that may arise in the course of any Chapter 11 case, as well as
the law's general suspicion of restrictions on alienability, a blanket
prohibition on trading would be overbroad, sacrificing possible benefits in a given case for the sake of overall administrative simplicity.
In this Part, a proposal is developed pursuant to which a party
may petition the court for equitable relief from claims trading in certain circumstances. The form of relief-a "trading injunction" restricting certain trading under certain conditions-attempts to balance
competing interests of selling creditors and other parties in interest,
recognizing the benefits that may derive from trading, as well as potential harm to the reorganization process. 318
A.

The Trading Injunction Concept

Many of the problematic effects of claims trading on the reorganization process could be avoided by restricting significant trading after
some initial period after the filing of the petition. In the initial period,
claims trading should be freely allowed, subject to existing rules and
limitations. During this period, claimants have the opportunity to decide whether to accept the risks of reorganization or to cash out. They
have time to assess the debtor's reorganization prospects and their
own particular interests. They have time to decide whether to liquidate their claims by selling or to undertake the risks of reorganization
in hopes of a better payout. By the same token, prospective bankruptcy investors have an opportunity to assess the debtor's attractiveness from an investment perspective.
Following some initial period, a party in interest should be able to
petition the court for a trading injunction-an order restricting trading in significant numbers or amounts. A debtor or significant credi317 See supra section I.B.2.

318 The approach described below is by no means offered as an exclusive approach. Other
circumstances as well may justify equitable relief.
For example, no attempt is made herein to describe a workable approach to dealing with the
effects of the bankruptcy investor's new money perspective or strategic purchasing in reorganization. When the bankruptcy investor enters a case by aggregating a large block of small, widely
dispersed trade claims, it will undoubtedly affect the course of the reorganization, sometimes to
the detriment of the debtor and competing creditors. The bankruptcy investor's acquired position will simply enable it to demand more from the collective than the creditors it replaced.
However, no suggestion is intended herein that the debtor and other creditors are generally
entitled to preservation of the happenstance of widely dispersed trade creditors-weaker combatants in the negotiation-and that assignment to the bankruptcy investor should be enjoined
on that basis alone.
In any event, availability of equitable relief should depend on the particular case at hand.
Any prescription for equitable relief must by definition remain general and flexible.
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tor may wish to assure that its investment and the collective
investment by the parties toward consensus on the plan will not be
dissipated by the exit or entry of a significant creditor.319 Such an
order, removing creditors' pre-confirmation exit options, would promote cultivation of relationships
among the parties, with their accom320
panying cooperation benefits.
Basically, each creditor and potential bankruptcy investor would
have to make its "in or out" decision in the early part of the case.
Absent special circumstances, those opting in would in effect be opting in for the entire case. Roughly speaking, a primary market in
claims would be permitted-allowing original claliholders to sellbut only a limited secondary market. 321 Speculative investment decisions would have to be made early on in the case. Once trading were
restricted, claimholders would become medium- to long-term investors, not traders. Such an arrangement allows small creditors to cash
out of a large and complex case, for which they may not be equipped
actively to participate. 322 It allows financial institutions-both original claimholders and bankruptcy investors-to make new investment
decisions and to execute them.
Encouraging potential buyers and sellers to make their investment decisions early in the process reduces reorganization costs to the
estate and other parties. It avoids the disruptive effects of significant
creditors' exit or entry after parties have invested significant sums participating in the reorganization. Once the long-term players are identifled, reorganization-specific capital is preserved. The disincentives
to cooperate because of uncertainty over parties' commitment to the
process is minimized.
The timing and scope of such an injunction is critical. The injunction should be tailored as much as possible to the complexion of the
particular case, with an eye to preserving benefits that might be realized from claims trading to the extent not incompatible with the rehabilitative goals of Chapter 11. Because the terms of any trading
injunction must seek to balance the negative effects of actual and potential creditor turnover against the possible benefits of trading, the
timing and scope of the injunction will vary from case to case. Like
any equitable remedy, the injunction should be subject to revision
once issued in order to reflect changed circumstances.

319 See supra section II.B.2.
320 See supra section II.B.3.
321 Any significant secondary trading would have to occur during the initial trading period.
322 Limitations on trading will to some extent reduce the consideration obtainable by selling
claimants.
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B.

The Contours

Definitive rules with respect to scope and timing of trading injunctions would be difficult to describe except in general terms. But
this is not unusual. The bankruptcy court's case-by-case determination of fundamental questions is pervasive in reorganization. The
nebulous "for cause" standard, for example, appears throughout the
Code in other contexts critical to the confirmation process: modification of exclusivity,3 23 appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, 324 and relief from stay. 325 The feasibility determination by its nature requires a
case-by-case approach. 326 "Good faith" and "bad faith" are also
sprinkled throughout the Code.3 27 Such discretion
comports with the
3 28
bankruptcy court's role as a court of equity.
1. Timing.-The appropriate duration for the initial trading period-and the stage in the case at which an order restricting trading
would be appropriate-will vary from case to case and perhaps from
class to class in a given reorganization. The trading period should be
of sufficient duration to allow all interested parties to assess the
debtor's financial condition, its operations, and the general condition
of its business. This assessment will be a more complicated affair for a
widely diversified debtor than for a company with only a few core
businesses. The length of the trading period should account for the
particular debtor and the complexity of the analysis required.
323 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1994).
324 Id. § 1104(a)(1).
325 Id. § 362(d)(1).

326 [T]he court should consider the adequacy of the capital structure, the earning power of
the business, economic conditions, the ability of management, the probability of a continuation of the same management, and any other related matters which determine the prospects
of a sufficiently successful operation to enable performance of the provisions of the plan.
5 COLLImR ON BANKR PTcY, supra note 47,

1129.02[11], at 1129-62.

327 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B) (1994) (municipality may qualify for Chapter 9 filing
although it failed to obtain agreement of required creditor majorities, if it negotiated with them
in good faith); id. § 303(i)(2) (involuntary petitioner liable for bad faith filing); id. § 1126(e)
(designation of votes not cast, solicited, or procured in good faith); id. § 1129(a)(3) (Chapter 11
plan must be proposed in good faith); id. § 1325(a)(3) (Chapter 13 plan must be proposed in
good faith).
328 See supra section III.C.1.
Bankruptcy reorganization more closely resembles an administrative process than it does
the traditional model of judicial resolution of bilateral disputes over rights. "Bankruptcy itself
could be regarded as a form of regulation and there are occasional proposals to have the bankruptcy system run by an administrative agency." Eisenberg, supra note 197, at 5 n.11. The sort
of discretion proposed is consistent with this idea.
Granted, several of these areas of judicial discretion have pre-Code antecedents-or at least
legislative history-that help inform the exercise of discretion. The trading injunction's pedigree, however, is a bit less well-documented. As discussed previously, the negative effects of
claims trading in Chapter 11 had no close pre-Code analog. Courts are only beginning to recognize and articulate the types of claims trading activity that justify equitable relief. See supra
subpart III.C.
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However, the duration of the trading period should generally not
be affected by the timing of particular events external to the case that
might affect buyers' or sellers' investment decisions. For example,
prospective buyers and sellers might wish to wait for release of the
next government reports on consumer spending before having to decide whether to opt in or out of the case. However, throughout the
course of any case, the stream of significant external events that would
affect investment decisions would be endless. The rationale for limiting trading to the initial period following the filing of the petition is to
insulate the reorganization process from the vicissitudes generated by
a secondary market in claims and the attendant costs imposed on the
parties. No attempt should be made to mimic a secondary market in
claims by allowing buying or selling in reaction to market news as it
arises, whenever it arises.
2. Scope.-As for the scope of restrictions, only trading that
would not affect the overall composition of the creditor polity should
escape the trading injunction's general prohibition. For example, de
minimis buying and selling of publicly traded bonds by small claimants
during the injunction period should not be prohibited, given that such
purchasing would not affect the reorganization process. By contrast,
aggregation or sale of a significant block of bonds should fall within
the prohibition. Whether the line between "de minimis" and "significant" trading should be drawn at one, five, ten percent, or some
higher percentage of the total face amount of all bonds in the class, or
at some specific dollar threshold based on face amount of bonds,
should depend on the particular case and should be determined in
light of the general goals described above.
Once entered, the trading injunction would not necessarily be irrevocable. Parties desiring to accomplish some transaction otherwise
prohibited by the injunction could certainly move for its modification.
After a trading injunction has been entered, for example, an outside
investor may decide to make a significant investment in return for a
significant equity stake in the reorganized debtor. One way to accomplish this transaction while cleaning up the debtor's capital structure
would be for the outside investor to purchase junior claims, which
would receive equity in the reorganized debtor as consideration under
the plan. This allows for the retirement of debt at a discount while
accomplishing the equity investment. 329 In this situation, as with
329 For example, in the bankruptcy reorganization of Carter Hawley Hale Stores, the ZellChilmark Fund made a public tender for the debtor's trade claims and public debt claims. Prior
to making its tender, it obtained the bankruptcy court's blessing with respect to, inter alia, allow-

ance of and voting privileges with respect to the tendered claims, and its good faith in making
the tender offer. See Joint Motion for an Order Authorizing Transfer of Claims and Approval of
Compromise (July 29, 1992) (Case No. LA-91-64140 JD). This tender was part of ZellChilmark's overall strategy to invest in the debtor, pursuant to which it ultimately received a
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others relating to modification of the trading injunction, a "for cause"
standard should apply. The court should weigh the potential benefits
from the proposed trade and investment against the possible destabilizing effects and imposition of costs on the parties in interest.
Modification of the trading injunction might be justified when a
claimant with a significant block of claims in a class wishes to increase
its stake by purchasing small claims in the class. Especially if the
claimant already holds a blocking position in the class, the disruptive
effect of the proposed purchases would seem minimal. In that context, those small claimants wishing to exit should be allowed to do so.
The benefit to them could be achieved with no disruption to the Chapter 11 community.
The same purchaser proposing to buy from another significant
claimholder in the class presents a different and more difficult issue.
If the proposed seller had been active in the case, transferring its
block of claims into the hands of another significant creditor might
disrupt the course of negotiation. A "for cause" inquiry might suggest
that harm to the estate and parties in interest would result from
destabilization of the plan formulation process, and therefore modification of the trading injunction would not be appropriate.
A proposed transfer of a significant block of claims to a complete
stranger to the case would be even more objectionable. The trading
injunction should clearly prohibit such transfers, as well as the sale of
participations that would effect the same economic result.
Outright prohibition may not be the only possible solution to particular proposed trades that would otherwise violate a trading injunction. Situations could be imagined in which further claim transfers
might be restricted to transfer of economic interests in the claims; voting power would not be transferred but would simply be foregone
with the sale of the claims. In other words, the sale of claims would
cause elimination of those votes from the class to which the claims
belonged. Depending on the composition of the class, such an order
could allow late-selling claimants to exit, but preclude newcomers
from retrading deals already struck with the class as a whole. 330
While no specific statutory authority exists for the concept of the
trading injunction and initial trading period, equitable relief is consistent with decisions relying on courts' general equitable powers under
Section 105(a) to prevent dissipation of estate assets. Especially after
the case has been underway for some time, all parties have made significant investments in the process. These investments deserve to be
preserved.
controlling interest in the equity of the reorganized debtor. See Gregory A. Patterson, Carter
Hawley Files a Proposal To Reorganize, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1992, at A3.
330 Allowing claims only in the amount of the consideration paid-for voting, or distribution,
or both-might also be appropriate in a given context.
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The trading injunction balances the interests of creditors, who
may wish to cash out, with the overall needs of the Chapter 11 community in a stable creditor constituency. The option to sell is initially
preserved, but as the stakes rise as parties become invested in the
case, the sale option is curtailed in favor of preserving stability of the
reorganization process.
V.

CONCLUSION

Bargaining is central to Chapter 11. The solution to the debtor's
financial distress is meant to be a product of the parties' collective
negotiation. Invocation of Chapter 11's collective regime transforms
each creditor's relationship with the debtor into a multilateral relationship with the debtor and other parties in interest. The structure of
this negotiation regime renders it susceptible to disruption if the faces
at the negotiating table change in significant numbers or at inopportune moments, or even if the faces might change.
Those wishing to leave the table will certainly have good reason
to do so. Likewise for new participants at the table. However, others
at the table may suffer as a result. Negotiation in Chapter 11 is not
faceless or anonymous. Claimants' rights are not standardized or fungible, but contingent. What each claimant gets at the end of the day
depends on who comes to the table and what she has to say. This is

the essence of the bargaining regime.
A commodities market model is therefore a poor exemplar for
devising rules for claims trading. While free alienability of rights

should not lightly be infringed, consideration of the question should
include clear assessment of all the consequences. Relationships matter in Chapter 11. Certainly at some point in the reorganization process, the parties' investment-in their relationships and in the
reorganization generally-has reached a level of significance such that
it should be considered in the balance. This Article asserts that that
point will often be reached well before the confirmation hearing.

Once the potential adverse effects of claims trading are recognized,
the need for equitable relief becomes clear.
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